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Abstract
One of the most defining features of the global financial network is its inherent complex and
intertwined structure. From the perspective of systemic risk it is important to understand
the influence of this network structure on default contagion. Using sparse random graphs
to model the financial network, asymptotic methods turned out powerful to analytically
describe the contagion process and to make statements about resilience. So far, however,
they have been limited to so-called rank one models in which informally the only network
parameter is the degree sequence (see [3, 20] for example) and the contagion process can
be described by a one dimensional fix-point equation. These networks fail to account for a
pronounced block structure such as core/periphery or a network composed of different con-
nected blocks for different countries. We present a much more general model here, where we
distinguish vertices (institutions) of different types and let edge probabilities and exposures
depend on the types of both, the receiving and the sending vertex plus additional param-
eters. Our main result allows to compute explicitly the systemic damage caused by some
initial local shock event, and we derive a complete characterisation of resilient respectively
non-resilient financial systems. This is the first instance that default contagion is rigorously
studied in a model outside the class of rank one models and several technical challenges arise.
Moreover, in contrast to previous work, in which networks could be classified as resilient
or non resilient, independent of the distribution of the shock, information about the shock
becomes important in our model and a more refined resilience condition arises. Among other
applications of our theory we derive resilience conditions for the global network based on
subnetwork conditions only.
Keywords: systemic risk, financial contagion, inhomogeneous random graphs, weighted random
graphs, directed random graphs, stochastic block model, core-periphery, assortative random
graphs, counterparty dependent exposures
1 Introduction
Modern financial networks of counterparty exposures are characterized by a huge intrinsic com-
plexity. One example for this are cross-border relations that have emerged over the last decades
in the course of globalization [11, 17, 27, 35]. While the possibility of making business on an
international level certainly provides benefits to single institutions by facilitating diversification
and giving access to different markets [1, 4, 32, 5, 18, 21], the convoluted trans-border dependen-
cies can also pose a great threat to the global system and increase systemic risk. The financial
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Figure 1: A sample network consisting of two cores (darkblue resp. darkgreen) and the associated
peripheries (lightblue resp. lightgreen). Vertex sizes correspond to the respective degrees. For
simplicity the network is depicted undirected and the strength of links is omitted.
crisis in the years 2007/08 is a striking example of how an initially locally confined shock – the
burst of the US housing bubble – had a catastrophic impact on the economy worldwide. In
addition to cross-border exposures connecting various subsystems, modern financial networks
also exhibit a distinctive tiered structure – usually referred to as core-periphery structure –
that can arise in many different shapes; see [8] for Austria, [14] for Brazil, [16] for Germany,
[23] for Italy, [31] for the Netherlands, [34] for the UK, and [2] for the European interbank
network. It is an important research question to model and understand how these complex
network configurations influence the stability of financial systems.
One important direct channel of systemic risk that we focus on here is default contagion.
Instead of considering a concrete system configuration, we use a random graph setting to gener-
ate a whole ensemble of possible financial networks and it is assumed that the observed network
is a typical member of this family. This can be achieved by calibrating the random graph’s dis-
tribution to macroscopic statistical properties of the observed network, such as the distribution
of the degrees and the balance sheet exposures. Our results in this setting are then derived
in terms of these global statistics only and hold for essentially the whole ensemble of random
configurations. In particular, members of this family can vary significantly on a microscopic
level, rendering this approach robust to local changes of the network or statistical uncertainties.
Furthermore, under the premise that over time the network may change locally but keeps its
global statistics, a fact that is supported empirically by [14] in the context studied here, the
results are applicable also for future systems; this is a desirable property from a regulator’s
point of view. Additionally, as the results for contagion in random graphs are typically derived
in an asymptotic way for a large number of institutions, there is a naturally emerging notion
of resilience of a network that does not depend on any arbitrarily chosen parameters such as
confidence values.
Within the literature on financial networks the random graphs perspective was first intro-
duced in [24] and carried out for the configuration model in [3]. In [29, 30] it has been extended
to a version of the configuration model which allows to capture assortativity of the network. The
works [19, 20] analyze default contagion on inhomogeneous random graphs. Other papers that
investigate how the network structure influences contagion use for example matrix majorisation
in [10] or Baysian methods in [12].
Contribution Our paper provides a systematic analysis of the effect of complex network
structures on contagion and system stability by means of random graphs. We quantify the
effect that different subsystems such as core/periphery, geographical location, institutional form
(bank, insurance, etc.), have on contagion in the global system and we make combined effects
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of global network structures and local heterogeneity explicit. Our model setup accounts for
the strong complexity observed in global, tiered financial systems in contrast to previous work
which has depicted only the effect of heterogeneity, measured in terms of the degree distribution
of the individual institutions.
Block Model To describe different subsystems (blocks) to every vertex we assign a type and
vertices with the same type form a block. Institutions of the same type could be similar in
terms of business strategy or they could reside in the same country for example. In addition we
assign a vector of weights to each vertex (institution) in the graph that describes the tendency
to develop random edges to vertices of a certain type and thus controls the local characteristics
(degree) of the vertex. Figure 1 illustrates a sample from our model with only two types
(blue and green) and different weights (and as a result degrees) for vertices of the same type.
Our model is a tradeoff to reflect the above mentioned characteristics of financial networks
but at the same time preserve analytical tractability. In its undirected version our network
skeleton model can be embedded in a general class of random graphs proposed in [7] based on
possibly uncountable number of types but without weights. While we believe that in the most
general model setting described in [7] a finite dimensional analytic description for the contagion
processes is not possible, the combination of types and weights allows us to derive a full analytic
description of the process with a multi but finite dimensional system of differential equations.
To our knowledge this is the first paper that investigates such kind of process in a model outside
the popular class of rank 1 models (or variants thereof) which lead to one dimensional fixpoint
equations for the contagion process (see [3, 19, 20]). The resulting multivariate setting poses
significant new challenges on the analytical side especially for deriving stopping criteria that
ensure that contagion activity in one subsystem is not reinitiating activity in a part that has
slowed down already. We mention that – especially in the statistical physics literature – one
often refers to fitness of a vertex instead of type, see [9, 25, 26, 37] for example. As our model
description strongly depends on the choice of vertex types (blocks), for calibration purposes one
needs to draw on methods for detection of communities and core-periphery structure, which are
well developed. See for instance [6, 13, 15, 22, 40, 41] respectively [28, 36].
Exposure Distributions The standard setting in the random-graph approach to default con-
tagion is that exposure distributions only depend on the creditor banks. Just thinking of the
example of a core-periphery network shows the limitations of this assumption, as liabilities
between core-banks should be significantly higher than liabilities of a core-bank to a periphery-
bank. In the present work we waive this assumption thus allowing for realistic exposure distri-
butions. While this might seem like a minor additional feature, it in fact increases mathematical
complexity significantly as variations in the banks exposures cannot be encoded in vertex fea-
tures anymore as in previous instances in which the contagion process could be reduced to a
threshold model ([3, 20]). The exposures now become an integral part of the contagion process
and it is one of the technical contributions of this article to provide in a first instance an analysis
of such a setting.
Analytic Results on the Final Default Fraction and Resilience Our main result in this paper
is a full analytic desciption of the default contagion process in our model. Our first main result
Theorem 3.4 identifies bounds for the final fraction of defaulted institutions in a system hit by
some arbitrarily specified initial shock. The following informal statement summarizes the main
insights from Theorem 3.4.
Mock Theorem. Consider a financial network of size n ∈ N that was hit by some exogenous
shock so that some of the banks are initially defaulted. Then under certain regularity assumptions
there exist constants 0 ≤ k ≤ K ≤ 1 such that
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k + op(1) ≤ number of finally defaulted institutions
n
≤ K + op(1),
where op(1) denotes a term that vanishes as n becomes large. The constants k,K can be com-
puted explicitly in terms of the global network statistics. In most relevant settings lower and
upper bound equal (k = K).
For large network sizes n, the theorem hence determines explicitly the fraction of finally
defaulted institutions in the system. As it only depends on the global network statistics the
result is robust to statistical uncertainties on an institution level and stays true also for future
points in time as long as macro-statistical properties of the system do not change much.
From a regulator’s viewpoint, more than merely describing the contagion process for certain
shock events, it is important to understand whether today’s financial system is able to absorb
possible future shocks. A common approach to this question in risk management is to choose
certain parameters for the initial stress and quantiles of the final damage that are deemed
admissible. Our approach for large networks, however, gives rise to a parameter-free alternative:
we call a system non-resilient if the final fraction of defaulted institutions is lower bounded by
a positive constant no matter how small the initial shock was.
Building on our description of the final default fraction, a second main contribution of this
paper is thus to derive explicit criteria to decide whether a certain system is (non-)resilient.
In contrast to the previous literature (see [3, 19, 20]) where a system was classified either as
resilient or non-resilient independent of the shock that is applied it turns out that in the model
studied here the distribution of the initial shock becomes relevant. Different shocks may target
different subsystems and the effect varies greatly; this allows us to quantify the effect of clusters
and tiers for system stability more accurately than previous work and we can investigate which
network characteristics promote the spread of distress and how global cascades can be contained.
Applications Recall that the leading question we want to study in this paper is what impact
the complex intertwining of modern financial networks – such as the global connectedness and
the tiered structures – has on their stability. We demonstrate by several applications how the
features of our model effect the course of the contagion process. First, we consider the influence
of a non-resilient subsystem on a lager global system. We find that not only this non-resilient
subpart may make the system as a whole non-resilient, but it can also cause severe damage to a
priori resilient parts of the network. More crucially, we also find that a system consisting only
of resilient subsystems may become non-resilient due to cross-type (e. g. cross-border) linkages.
Therefore, we further derive criteria for resilience of the global system based on conditions
for the subsystems and the connectivity between them. Finally, we consider the reshuffling of
exposures in a network where originally all exposures only depend on the creditor – the exposed
party – such that the new network’s exposures respect a core-periphery structure. We show
that by this procedure an initially resilient system can become non-resilient, which stresses the
importance of creditor and debtor dependent exposures in a model for default contagion as
otherwise contagion effects are underestimated.
Outline The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the random graph and
describe the model for default contagion. We then derive asymptotic results on the final default
fraction in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss (non-)resilience and the corresponding criteria. We
then present our applications in Section 5 and perform simulations for finite networks. Finally,
we provide proofs of our results in Section 6.
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2 Default Contagion on a Random Multi-type Network
We describe a model for a financial network consisting of n ∈ N vertices (institutions) and
random directed edges between them. We usually think of an institution i ∈ [n] := {1, . . . , n} ⊂
N as a bank in an interbank network and of a directed edge going from institution i ∈ [n]
to j ∈ [n] as a financial exposure of j which emanates from i, for example by an outstanding
interbank-loan from i to j. Our model accounts for two more features. First, we assign exposures
to the edges representing the amount of the loan. As will be clear from the construction in the
following, the assignment of exposures depends on both the creditor- and the debtor-institution.
Second, we assign different types to the institutions in the network. This allows to describe
more involved network structures such as core-periphery networks – a two-type network in our
terminology – and (dis-)assortative structures.
2.1 Vertex Types
We begin by assigning to each institution i ∈ [n] a type αi ∈ [T ], where T ∈ N is the fixed
number of types. In the prominent case of a core-periphery network we choose T = 2 and a
bank i ∈ [n] shall be a core bank if αi = 1 resp. a periphery bank if αi = 2. Alternatively
banks in one country or region could be assigned the same type. Hence the financial network is
partitioned into sets of institutions of different types, which we also call blocks.
2.2 Vertex Weights and Random Exposures
Next, we fix R ∈ N and we construct a random network with exposures in [R]. To this end,
assign to each institution i ∈ [n] a set {w−,r,αi , w+,r,αi }1≤r≤R,1≤α≤T of non-negative vertex-
weights. Here the weight w−,r,αi describes the tendency of bank i to develop incoming edges
with exposure r from institutions of type α. Similarly, w+,r,αi describes the tendency of i to
form outgoing edges with exposure r to institutions of type α. To formalize this, let Xri,j be the
indicator random variable which is 1 if there is an edge with exposure r going from i to j and
0 otherwise and let Xri,j ∼ Be(pri,j) be a Bernoulli random variable with expectation
pri,j :=
{
min{R−1, n−1}w+,r,αji w−,r,αij , i 6= j,
0, i = j.
(2.1)
To avoid multiple edges with different exposures between the institutions, we assume {Xri,j}1≤r≤R
to be mutually exclusive in the sense that
∑
1≤r≤RX
r
i,j ≤ 1. Also, we assume that edges between
different pairs of institutions are independent, i. e. Xr1i1,j1 ⊥ Xr2i2,j2 for all r1, r2 ∈ [R] if i1 6= i2 or
j1 6= j2. In particular, Xr1i,j ⊥ Xr2j,i for all r1, r2 ∈ [R], i 6= j. This can for example be achieved
by introducing a sequence of independent random variables Ui,j , each distributed uniformly on
the interval [0, 1], and letting Xri,j = 1
{
Ui,j ∈
[∑
s≤r−1 p
s
i,j ,
∑
s≤r p
s
i,j
)}
. The upper bound R−1
in (2.1) then ensures that
∑
s≤R p
s
i,j ≤ 1.
2.3 Capital and Default Contagion
We assign to each institution i ∈ [n] an initial amount of capital (equity) ci ∈ N0∪{∞}. We call
an institution solvent if ci > 0 and insolvent if ci = 0 and we denote by D0 := {i ∈ [n] : ci = 0}
the set of initially defaulted institutions. The initial default shall be due to some exogenous
event such as a stock market crash. Because of the interconnections in the network the default of
the institutions in D0 will spread through the network. This happens since the defaulted banks
cannot (fully) repay their loans to their creditors. As first suggested in [24] it is a reasonable
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assumption that defaulted debtors cannot repay any of their debts since processing their default
may take months or even years while financial contagion is a short term process. In fact one
can generalize our model to the case of a fixed constant recovery rate simply by adjusting the
capitals. The default contagion process can then be described as follows. In round k ≥ 1 of the
default cascade the set of defaulted institutions is
Dk :=
{
i ∈ [n] : ci ≤
∑
r∈[R]
r
∑
j∈Dk−1
Xrj,i
}
. (2.2)
In particular, D0 ⊆ D1 ⊆ · · · and the chain of default sets stabilizes at round n− 1 the latest.
We hence denote the final default set by Dn := Dn−1. Note that the only randomness in this
process stems from the random links in the network. Once a network configuration has been
fixed, the whole default contagion sequence is fully determined. The following two remarks
address interesting possible extensions of our setting.
Remark 2.1. In the following we use the fraction of finally defaulted institutions n−1|Dn| as a
measure for the severity of a given shock in the network. It makes sense, however, to not only
consider the finally defaulted institutions but to introduce a parameter si ∈ R+,0 of general
systemic importance for each bank i ∈ [n] and use Sn := n−1
∑
i∈Dn si to measure the severity
of the shock. Since the systemic importance values si do not influence the process (2.2), all our
results can be extended to this more general setting under mild assumptions on {si}i∈[n]. See
Remark 3.6 for the general setting.
Remark 2.2. To model realistic financial networks with general exposure values, it would be a
priori necessary to choose R very large and our model would become high-dimensional. Instead
of considering an exposure r between two institutions, however, one can also interpret it as a
more general factor of impact. It is then possible to model unbounded exposure distributions
also with a considerably small choice of R. More precisely, we can assign to each institution
i ∈ [n] a list of exchangeable random variables and take the sum over r-many of them to compute
the actual exposure of an edge with impact r. Under minor assumptions on the distribution of
these exchangeable random variables, the main results of this paper can be generalized to this
setting by a conditioning argument. See [20] for a precise discussion of this idea in the case
R = T = 1.
2.4 Regular Vertex Sequences
In the previous subsections we introduced several parameters and in particular, any random
ensemble is described by the weight sequences w−,r,α := (w−,r,α1 , . . . , w
−,r,α
n ) and w+,r,α :=
(w+,r,α1 , . . . , w
+,r,α
n ) for r ∈ [R] and α ∈ [T ], the capital sequence c := (c1, . . . , cn), and the type
sequence α := (α1, . . . , αn). That is, much of the information about the system – in particular
the structure of the network configuration – is contained in the empirical distribution function
Fn(x,y, `,m) := n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
∏
r∈[R],α∈[T ]
1
{
w−,r,αi ≤ xr,α, w+,r,αi ≤ yr,α
}
1 {ci ≤ `, αi ≤ m} ,
for x,y ∈ R[R]×[T ], ` ∈ N0 ∪ {∞} and m ∈ [T ].
The setting described so far puts us in the position to model a system with a given number n
of institutions. However, as already described in the introduction, our main focus is in studying
how the structure in the underlying network affects the contagion process and, more generally,
the (in-)stability of the system as a whole. Towards this aim we proceed as follows. Instead of
restricting our attention to a single system configuration, we consider an ensemble of systems
that are similar, where the structural similarity is measured precisely in terms of the joint
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empirical distribution of all parameters that we consider. In particular, we assume that we
have a collection of systems with a varying number n of institutions with the property that the
sequence (Fn)n∈N of empirical distributions converges.
Definition 2.3 (Regular vertex sequence). A sequence (w−,r,α(n),w+,r,α(n), c(n),α(n))n∈N of
model parameters for different network sizes n ∈ N is called a regular vertex sequence if the
following conditions are satisfied. Note that we do not specify the ranges of r and α to keep
the notation concise. Here and in the following we always mean r ∈ [R] and α ∈ [T ].
(a) Convergence in distribution: Let (W−,r,αn ,W+,r,αn , Cn, An) be a random vector dis-
tributed according to the empirical distribution function Fn. Then there exists a dis-
tribution function F such that Fn(x,y, `,m) → F (x,y, `,m) for all points (x,y, `,m)
at which F`,m(x,y) := F (x,y, `,m) is continuous. Denote by (W
−,r,α,W+,r,α, C,A) a
random vector distributed according to F .
(b) Convergence of average weights: For n→∞ and all 1 ≤ r ≤ R, 1 ≤ α ≤ T :
E[W−,r,αn ]→ E[W−,r,α] <∞ and E[W+,r,αn ]→ E[W+,r,α] <∞.
To understand the asymptotic degree sequence of our model let us fix r ∈ [R] and only
look at links with exposure size r. We look at a vertex i ∈ [n] of type β with out-weight to
vertices of type α equal to w+,r,αi . Then its out-degree towards vertices of type α is a sum of
independent Bernoulli trials, whose expectation converges to w+,r,αi E[W−,r,α1{A = β}] due to
property (b) of Definition 2.3. With this observation similar ideas for a Poisson coupling of the
degree sequence as used in [19, Theorem 3.3] can be applied to prove the following result about
the degree sequence in our financial system.
Proposition 2.4. Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and let
D±,r,αn be the r-out/in-degree with respect to banks of type α of some bank in the network chosen
uniformly at random. Then for each (r, α) ∈ [R]× [T ], as n→∞, in distribution
D±,r,αn → Poi
(
W±,r,α
∑
β∈[T ]
ζr,β,α∓ 1{A = β}
)
, (2.3)
where ζr,β,α∓ := E
[
W∓,r,β1{A = α}]. In particular, the r-out/in-degree with respect to banks of
type α of some uniformly chosen bank of type β converges in distribution to Poi
(
W±,r,αζr,β,α∓
)
.
3 Asymptotic Results
This section presents results for the final default fraction n−1|Dn| triggered by some set of
initial defaults, which is one of the main contributions of this paper, see Subsection 3.2. In
Subsection 3.1, we first introduce some functions that will play an important role. For the sake
of readability, most of the – mainly technical – proofs of this section are moved to the appendix.
3.1 Preliminaries
Denote in the following V := [R] × [T ]2. Let ψ`(x1, . . . , xR) := P
(∑
s∈[R] sXs ≥ `
)
for inde-
pendent Poisson random variables Xs ∼ Poi(xs). In the following, functions f r,α,β : RV+,0 → R,
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(r, α, β) ∈ V , and g : RV+,0 → R+,0 will play a central role. They are given by
f r,α,β(z) = E
[
W+,r,αψC
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,1,γz1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,R,γzR,β,γ
)
1{A = β}
]
− zr,α,β,
g(z) =
∑
β∈[T ]
E
[
ψC
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,1,γz1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,R,γzR,β,γ
)
1{A = β}
]
.
Let us provide some intuition about the meaning of these functions. The contagion process
described in (2.2) can be restated in an equivalent sequential form where in each step only
the effect of one defaulted institution on the system is explored. Defaulted institutions can
then have two status: explored meaning their effect on the system has already been accounted
for and unexplored meaning that their effect on the system has not yet been accounted for.
We look at the case T = R = 1 first. Then there is only one function f = f1,1,1 of one
variable z = z1,1,1 which shall denote the total out-weight of defaulted and explored institutions
divided by n. For an institution i ∈ [n] with in-weight w−,1,1i we know that in the limit
(n→∞) the number of neighbors is given by Poi(w−,1,1i ζ) with ζ = ζ1,1,1+ the total out-weight
divided by n, i.e. ζ := E
[
W+,1,1
]
= n−1
∑
i∈[n]w
+,1,1
i + o(1). Replacing ζ by z the number of
defaulted and explored neighbours should intuitively be given by Poi(w1,1i z). Continuing with
this heuristics, the probability that i has defaulted (no matter if already exposed or unexposed)
is P(Poi(w−,1,1i z) ≥ ci) = ψci(w1,1i z) and summing up over i ∈ [n], the out-weight of all defaulted
institutions as a result of exposing defaulted institutions with out-weight roughly equal nz is
given by E[W+,1,1ψci(W−,1,1z)]. If E[W+,1,1ψci(W−,1,1z)] = z or equivalently f(z) = 0 then
there are no unexposed defaulted institutions and the process might come to a standstill.
In the multivariate case the variable zr,β,γ equals the sum of the out-weights of defaulted and
already explored type γ vertices for building edges with exposure r to type β vertices. For given
z ∈ RV+,0 the function value f r,α,β(z) quantifies the total out-weight of defaulted but unexplored
type β vertices for building edges with exposure r towards vertices of type α. Similarly as above
when f r,α,β(z) = 0 the total out-weight of defaulted and unexplored type β vertices for building
edges with exposure r to type α vertices is zero meaning that infection from β vertices to α
vertices via exposure of size r has slowed down but there can still be contagion activity in the
graph. Only when f r,α,β(z) = 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V the process might come to a standstill. Let
z be such a joint root. Then, in the limit (n → ∞), a vertex i ∈ [n] of type β with capital ci
has r-in-degree from type γ vertices approximately Poisson distributed with mean w−,r,γi zˆ
r,β,γ .
Vertex i thus defaults with probability ψci(
∑
γ∈[T ]w
−,1,γ
i zˆ
1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]w
−,R,γ
i zˆ
R,β,γ). If we
now choose the vertex i ∈ [n] uniformly instead, then its default probability is given by g(zˆ).
Before making this intuition rigorous and proving our main results we begin by investigating
some basic but important properties of these functions.
Lemma 3.1. The functions f r,α,β(z), (r, α, β) ∈ V , and g(z) are continuous at all z ∈ RV+,0.
Further, each function f r,α,β(z) is monotonically increasing in all of its coordinates except zr,α,β.
Proof. Continuity follows from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem noting that the in-
tegrands are continuous in z and bounded by the integrable random variable W+,r,α resp. by 1.
Monotonicity of f r,α,β follows directly from the monotonicity of the Poisson-probabilities.
Let now S :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V {z ∈ RV+,0 : f r,α,β(z) ≥ 0}. Since f r,α,β(z) < 0 for any z ∈ RV+,0
with zr,α,β > E[W+,r,α1{A = β}] and S is an intersection of closed sets, S is in fact compact.
Note that clearly 0 ∈ S. In general S might consist of several disjoint, compact, connected
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Figure 2: Plot of the root sets of the functions f1(z1, z2) (blue) and f2(z1, z2) (orange) for two
different example networks.
components. Let in the following S0 denote the component (i. e. the largest connected subset)
of S containing 0. Since S is a compact subset of RV+,0, so is S0. Define now z∗ ∈ RV+,0 by
(z∗)r,α,β := supz∈S0 z
r,α,β. The following lemma shows that in fact z∗ ∈ S0 and it can hence be
thought of as the maximal point of S0. Further it identifies z
∗ as a joint root of all the functions
f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , and shows the existence of a smallest joint root zˆ. It will turn out later
(see in particular Theorem 3.4) that the final fraction n−1|Dn| is intimately related to these two
(typically coinciding) joint roots of the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V .
Lemma 3.2. There exists a smallest joint root zˆ ∈ RV+,0 of all the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V ,
in the sense that zˆ ≤ z¯ componentwise for all joint roots z¯. Further, z∗ as defined above is a
joint root of the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , and both zˆ ∈ S0 and z∗ ∈ S0.
The lemma identifies z∗ as the maximal joint root of f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , in S0. However,
if S0 ( S, then there will exist joint roots z˜ 6∈ S0 such that z∗ ≤ z˜ componentwise.
Often zˆ and z∗ will coincide and then Theorem 3.4 below will show that the final default
fraction n−1|Dn| converges to g(zˆ) in probability. But in some pathological situations this is
not the case and Theorem 3.4 will yield a lower bound on n−1|Dn| in terms of zˆ and an upper
bound in terms of z∗. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show two-dimensional examples of f . In both
examples, we chose R = 2 and T = 1. In the first example, we further chose all weights to be 1
and the capital of each bank to be 3 with probability 80% respectively 0 with probability 20%.
The functions f1(z1, z2) := f1,1,1(z1, z2) and f2(z1, z2) := f2,1,1(z1, z2), where z1 := z1,1,1 and
z2 := z2,1,1, then have a unique joint root, i. e. zˆ = z∗. In the second example, we chose all
weights to be 2 and the capital of each bank to be 3 with probability ≈ 94.14% respectively 0
with probability ≈ 5.86%. In this case, there exist two distinct joint roots zˆ 6= z∗ in S0. At zˆ,
the root sets of f1 and f2 do not cross each other but only touch.
The next lemma provides two sufficient criteria to check if a joint root, such as zˆ, equals
z∗. These depend on the (weak) directional derivatives of f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , and are hence
natural extensions of the stable fixed point assumption in previous literature such as [3, 19, 20].
Lemma 3.3. If z¯ ∈ S0 is a joint root of the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , then z¯ = z∗ if one
of the following holds:
(a) There exists v ∈ RV+ such that for all (r, α, β) ∈ V the directional derivatives Dvf r,α,β(z¯)
exist and Dvf
r,α,β(z¯) < 0.
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(b) There exist v ∈ RV+, κ < 1 and ∆ > 0 such that for every δ ∈ (0,∆),
κvr,α,β ≥
∑
r′∈[R]
E
[
W+,r,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′W−,r
′,β′
)
1{A = β}
× P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γ
(
z¯s,β,γ + δvs,β,γ
))
∈ {C − r′, . . . , C − 1}
)]
.
3.2 The Main Result for the Final Default Fraction
We now provide an asymptotic formula for the final default fraction n−1|Dn| in terms of function
g and the joint roots zˆ and z∗. The one type and exposure 1 case (R = T = 1) of the follow-
ing result was obtained in [19, Theorem 2.3] under an additional differentiability assumption
guaranteeing that z∗ = zˆ.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and let zˆ and
z∗ be the smallest respectively largest joint root in S0 of the functions {f r,α,β}(r,α,β)∈V . Then
g(zˆ) + op(1) ≤ n−1|Dn| ≤ g(z∗) + op(1).
In particular, if zˆ = z∗, then n−1|Dn| = g(zˆ) + op(1).
See Section 6.3 for the proof.
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.4 determines g(zˆ) as a lower bound on the fraction of all finally
defaulted banks in the network. In fact, g(z) is given by a sum over all the different types
β ∈ [T ] in the network and it is thus no surprise that by small changes in the proofs of Theorems
6.3 and 3.4, one derives that the number of finally defaulted banks of type β is lower bounded by
nE
[
P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γ zˆs,β,γ
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
+ op(n).
The same reasoning allows to derive an upper bound in terms of z∗.
Remark 3.6. As mentioned in Remark 2.1, in many situations it makes sense to measure the
damage caused by a shock event to the whole system not simply by counting finally defaulted
banks but to weight them according to some systemic importance value si, i ∈ [n]. If the
empirical distribution of {si}i∈[n] converges in distribution and mean to a random variable
S, then in analogy to Theorem 3.4, the total systemic importance of finally defaulted banks
Sn :=
∑
i∈Dn si is lower bounded by n(gS(zˆ) + op(1)) and upper bounded by n(gS(z
∗) + op(1)),
where
gS(z) :=
∑
β∈[T ]
E
[
SP
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
.
4 Resilient and Non-Resilient Networks
In the previous section we derived results that allow us to determine the typical final default
fraction in large financial systems caused by an exogenous shock. Another important question
from a regulator’s point of view that we study in this section is whether a given system in an
initially unshocked state is likely to be resilient to small shocks or susceptible to default cascades.
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Note that for some fixed financial network (W−,r,α,W+,r,α, C,A) all information about the
initial shock stems from C and by “initially unshocked” we mean that ci > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. We
model small shocks to the system by an ex post infection in the following sense: we introduce
indicators mi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [n], with the meaning that (the initially solvent) bank i becomes
insolvent if mi = 0. This amounts to setting its capital to cimi. In analogy to Definition
2.3 we assume regularity of {mi}i∈[n] (jointly with the rest of the parameters) and we denote
by M the limiting random variable of ex post infection. In particular, the financial system
shall be described by the random vector (W−,r,α,W+,r,α, C,A,M) with P(C = 0) = 0 and
P(M = 0) > 0. Denote by DMn the random final default set that M triggers and by (fM )r,α,β,
gM and (z∗)M the analogues of f r,α,β, g respectively z∗ with C replaced by CM .
From a regulator’s point of view a desirable property of a financial system is the ability to
absorb small local shocks M without larger parts of the system being harmed. In our asymptotic
setting, we can even choose M arbitrarily small and we call a system resilient if the final default
fraction n−1|DMn | tends to 0 as P(M = 0)→ 0. If on the other hand n−1|DMn | is lower bounded
by some positive constant, we call the system non-resilient (see Definition 4.3 below). We
say that a sequence of events (En)n∈N holds with high probability (w. h. p.) if P(En) → 1, as
n→∞.
Definition 4.1 (Resilience). A financial system is said to be resilient if for each  > 0 there
exists δ > 0 such that for all M with P(M = 0) < δ it holds n−1|DMn | ≤  w. h. p.
It will turn out that the resilience of the system strongly depends on the form of the set S0
which was introduced in Subsection 3.1. Our first result is a criterion guaranteeing resilience.
Theorem 4.2 (Resilience Criterion). Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex
sequence and assume that S0 = {0}. Then the system is resilient.
In particular for R = T = 1, resilience is ensured if 0 = inf{z > 0 : f1,1,1(z) < 0} and
Theorem 4.2 extends the one dimensional setting studied in [19, Theorem 2.7]. Moreover, by
Lemma 3.3, if for some v ∈ RV+, Dvf r,α,β(0) exists and is negative for each (r, α, β) ∈ V , then
S0 = {0} and Theorem 4.2 is applicable.
Figure 3 shows a two-dimensional example satisfying the condition in Theorem 4.2. We
chose R = 2, T = 1, W±,1 = W±,2 = 1 and C = 3 and let z1 := z1,1,1 and z2 := z2,1,1. It
can be seen from the figure that a small shock (here 5% of all banks) keeps the smallest joint
root of f1(z1, z2) = f1,1,1(z1, z2) and f2(z1, z2) = f2,1,1(z1, z2) for the shocked system close to
(0, 0). By continuity properties of gM as P(M = 0)→ 0 and g(0, 0) = 0 it follows that the final
default fraction n−1DMn is small for shocks M with P(M = 0) small.
On the other hand, to characterize non-resilient networks, a difficulty that arises is that
the ex post shock M possibly targets only certain subnetworks or only vertices with certain
characteristics (weights). The subnetwork (for example core or periphery) that is targeted is
encoded in the joint distribution of (A,M) and it is not surprising that the effect of the ex-post
infections depends on P(A = α,M = 0) = E[1{A = β}1{M = 0}]. However, it turns out that
this information is not sufficient in order to determine the impact of the shock M completely
and also the weights of targeted institutions matter, i.e. whether the targeted institutions build
edges with exposure r ∈ [R] to vertices of type β ∈ [T ]. More precisely, define
V˜ := {(r, α, β) ∈ V : E[W+,r,α1{A = β}] > 0}
and note that (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ if vertices of type α build edges with exposure r to vertices of type β.
A shock M such that E[W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] = 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ targets only lenders
who are not borrowing themselves and it is not surprising that these shocks do not spread, i.e.
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Figure 3: Plot of the root sets of the functions f1(z1, z2) (blue) and f2(z1, z2) (orange) for
a financial system satisfying the condition in Theorem 4.2. Solid: the unshocked functions.
Dashed: the shocked functions.
the financial system is resilient with respect to these shocks. For all other shocks it turns out
that they can be classified by checking for each (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ if E[W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] is
equal to 0 or strictly greater than 0 instead. Consider for example a financial network consisting
of banks of two types which are isolated of each other. Further, one of the two subnetworks
shall be resilient, whereas the other one is non-resilient (in the sense of Definition 4.3 (b)). In
order for the whole system to experience large damage, it is then necessary that M does not
only infect banks in the resilient subsystem but also in the non-resilient one. This explains why
we have to differentiate between different choices for M in the following to fully understand
non-resilience in our model.
Definition 4.3 (Non-Resilience). (a) Let I ⊆ V˜ := {(r, α, β) ∈ V : E[W+,r,α1{A = β}] >
0}. A financial system is called non-resilient with respect to shocks on I if there exists a
constant ∆I > 0 such that n
−1|DMn | ≥ ∆I w. h. p. for each shock M with E[W+,r,α1{A =
β}1{M = 0}] > 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ I.
(b) We call a financial system non-resilient if it is non-resilient w. r. t. shocks on some I ⊆ V˜ .
Clearly if a system is non-resilient with respect to shocks on I it is also non-resilient with
respects to shocks on I˜ for I ⊂ I˜. It follows that a system is non-resilient if and only if it is
non-resilient w. r. t. shocks on V˜ .
Remark 4.4. Definition 4.3 characterizes networks as non-resilient (with respect to shocks on
I) if a lower bounded fraction of banks defaults. In many applications it might be desirable to
distinguish between different parts of the global network and only call a system non-resilient if
certain important parts experience lower bounded damage. This can be achieved by systemic
importance values as introduced in Remark 2.1: assign si = 0 to banks i in unimportant parts
of the global network and replace n−1|DMn | in Definitions 4.1 and 4.3 by SMn := n−1
∑
i∈DMn si.
Let us start by considering the special case that M infects every part of the system (i. e. a
shock on V˜ ). This is the case for example if M is independent of type A, vertex-weights W±,r,α
and capital C. We can then formulate a corollary of Theorem 4.7 stated below:
Corollary 4.5. Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and any ex
post infection M with E[W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] > 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ . Then w. h. p.
n−1|DMn | ≥ g(z∗). If z∗ 6= 0 (i. e. S0 6= {0}), then g(z∗) > 0 and the system is non-resilient.
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Figure 4: Plot of the root sets of the functions f1(z1, z2) (blue) and f2(z1, z2) (orange) for a
financial system with S0 6= {0}. Solid: the unshocked functions. Dashed: the shocked functions.
By Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.5 resilience of a financial system is hence completely char-
acterized by S0. See Figure 4 for an example where S0 6= {0}. In this example, we chose
R = 2, T = 1, weights W±,1 = W±,2 = 3/2 and capital C = 2. The figure shows the jump of
the smallest joint root from 0 to above z∗ for any small shock (here 10% of all banks). The
discontinuity of the roof set of f2 (orange line) shows that particularly the edges with exposure
r = 2 make the system non-resilient.
We now aim to describe non-resilience with respect to shocks on I ( V˜ . That is, we
consider shocks M such that E [W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] > 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ I but possibly
E [W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] = 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ \I. To this end, denote
T (I) :=
⋂
(r1,α1,β1)∈I
{
z ∈ RV+,0 : f r1,α1,β1(z) < 0
}
∩
⋂
(r2,α2,β2)∈V˜ \I
{
z ∈ RV+,0 : f r2,α2,β2(z) ≤ 0
}
and define z0(I) by z
r,α,β
0 (I) := infz∈T (I) z
r,α,β. Lemma 4.6 shows that z0(I) is the smallest
joint root of f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , that is stable with respect to shocks in the I-coordinates.
Lemma 4.6. It holds z0(I) ∈ S0 ∩ T (I) and it is thus a joint root of f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V .
We can state a general theorem for non-resilience in terms of z0(I), where I denotes the set
of coordinates impacted by M .
Theorem 4.7 (Non-Resilience Criterion). Consider a financial system described by a regular
vertex sequence and any ex post infection M with E[W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] > 0 for all
(r, α, β) ∈ I, where ∅ 6= I ⊆ V˜ . Then w. h. p. n−1|DMn | ≥ g(z0(I)). If z0(I) 6= 0, then
g(z0(I)) > 0 and the system is thus non-resilient with respect to shocks on I.
By Theorem 4.7 we derive for shocks on V˜ that for any  > 0 w. h. p. n−1|SMn | ≥ g(z0(V˜ ))−
while in Corollary 4.5 we claimed n−1|SMn | ≥ g(z∗)−  w. h. p. By the following lemma the two
are in fact equivalent.
Lemma 4.8. It holds z0(V˜ ) = z
∗.
The identity z0(I) = z
∗ on the other hand does not necessarily imply I = V˜ .
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5 Applications
The theory developed in the previous sections allows to investigate many interesting novel
settings as compared to the present literature. In this section, we discuss some of them and
highlight their implications. Further, we demonstrate the applicability of our asymptotic results
also for finite networks of reasonable size by numerical simulations.
In the first example, we investigate the influence of a non-resilient subsystem in a global
system. Unsurprisingly the global system turns out to be non-resilient as well and we can further
show that even resilient network parts become non-resilient by their connections to the non-
resilient subsystem, i. e. every howsoever small infection that occurs only within the resilient
part of the system finally spreads to a lower bounded fraction of the resilient subsystem.
Example 5.1. For simplicity assume R = 1 and denote zα,β := z1,α,β, fα,β(z) := f1,α,β(z)
and W±,α := W±,1,α in the following. Consider then a 1-type banking system, described by the
random vector (W˜−, W˜+, C˜), where P(W˜+ > 0) = 1 and P(C˜ = 0) = 0, and assume that it is
non-resilient. In the 1-dimensional case this breaks down to the existence of z˜0 > 0 such that
f˜(z) := E
[
W˜+P
(
Poi
(
W˜−z
)
≥ C˜
)]
− z ≥ 0, for all z ∈ [0, z˜0].
Now introduce a second (possibly resilient) subsystem to the network. That is, the system is
now described by the random vector (W±,1,1,W±,1,2,W±,2,1,W±,2,2, C,A), where P(C = 0) = 0,
A ∈ {1, 2} and αi = 1 means that bank i ∈ [n] is in the non-resilient subsystem, whereas αi = 2
means that i is part of the second subsystem. In order for the characteristics of the non-resilient
subsystem to be preserved, we require that W−,1|A=1 d= W˜−, W+,1|A=1 d= W˜+/P(A = 1) (to
account for the changed number of banks; due to the multiplicative form in (2.1) it is sufficient
to adjust either in- or out-weights by P(A = 1)) and C|A=1 d= C˜. We derive that
f1,1(z) = E
[
W+,1P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z1,1 +W−,2z1,2
) ≥ C)1{A = 1}]− z1,1 ≥ f˜ (z1,1) ≥ 0
for all z = (z1,1, z1,2, z2,1, z2,2) with z1,1 ∈ [0, z˜0] and in particular z1,10 (I) ≥ z˜0 > 0, where
I := {(1, 1)}. An application of Theorem 4.7 then yields that the fraction of finally defaulted
banks in the network is lower bounded by
g(z0(I)) = E
[
P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z1,10 (I) +W
−,2z1,20 (I)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = 1}
]
+ E
[
P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z2,10 (I) +W
−,2z2,20 (I)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = 2}
]
w. h. p. for any ex post infection M satisfying P(M = 0, A = 1) > 0 (i. e. infecting some banks in
the non-resilient subsystem). That is, if a small fraction of banks in the non-resilient subsystem
defaults due to an external shock event, then this infection spreads to the whole system and the
fraction of finally defaulted banks in the second subsystem is w. h. p. lower bounded by
E
[
P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z2,10 (I) +W
−,2z2,20 (I)
)
≥ C
) ∣∣∣ A = 2] . (5.1)
In fact, if we assume that W+,2|A=1 > 0 almost surely and P(W−,1 > 0, C < ∞, A = 2) > 0
(that is, there are some banks in the second subsystem lending to banks in the non-resilient
subsystem), then it must hold that
z2,10 (I) ≥ E
[
W+,2P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z1,10 (I)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = 1}
]
> 0
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and hence the lower bound (5.1) is strictly positive. That is, every howsoever small infected
fraction in the non-resilient subsystem spreads to a lower bounded fraction of finally defaulted
banks in the second subsystem as well.
Now finally assume that W+,1|A=2 > 0 almost surely and P(W−,2 > 0, C < ∞, A = 1) > 0
(that is, there are some banks in the non-resilient subsystem lending to banks in the second
subsystem). By considering the function
f1,2(z) = E
[
W+,1P
(
Poi
(
W−,1z2,1 +W−,2z2,2
) ≥ CM)1{A = 2}]− z1,2,
we derive that (zˆM )1,2 > 0 for any ex post infection M such that P(M = 0, A = 2) > 0 (that is,
infecting some banks in the second subsystem) and hence also (zˆM )1,1 > 0 by the form of f1,1(z)
(see above). By the same means as before, we hence conclude that in fact zˆM ≥ z0(I) and so
the lower bounds derived above still hold. In particular, this means that every howsoever small
initial shock to the second (possibly resilient) subsystem causes the default of a lower bounded
fraction of banks in the second subsystem. That is, by connecting to the non-resilient subsystem
the a priori possibly resilient second subsystem becomes non-resilient as well.
To better understand the phenomenon in Example 5.1, we specify all parameters explicitly:
Let
W−,1|A=1 = w1, W+,1|A=1 = 2w1, C|A=1 = 1,
W−,2|A=2 = w2, W+,2|A=2 = 2w2, C|A=2 = 2,
for w1 > 1 and w2 > 0. The parameters w1 and w2 are then a measure for how strongly
connected the respective subsystems are and it is easy to confirm that the type-1 subsystem
is in fact non-resilient whereas the type-2 subsystem is resilient. Both subnetworks are Erdo¨s-
Re´nyi random graphs. In the first subnetwork every edge is contagious and because of w1 > 1
there exists a giant component (a component of size λn for some λ > 0). As soon as one vertex
in the giant component defaults, the entire giant component defaults. The second subnetwork
can be easily seen to be resilient by analysing the respective functional. Additionally, we
assume that both subsystems have the same size and edges from subsystem 1 to subsystem
2 are as likely as edges from subsystem 2 to subsystem 1, i.e. P(A = 1) = P(A = 2) = 1/2
and W±,1|A=2 = W±,2|A=1 = w3 > 0. The parameter w3 is a measure for how strongly
interconnected the different subsystems are. In particular,
w3
(
f1,1(z) + z1,1
)
= 2w1
(
f2,1(z) + z2,1
)
, w3
(
f2,2(z) + z2,2
)
= 2w2
(
f1,2(z) + z1,2
)
and hence it must hold that z2,10 (I) = (2w1)
−1w3 z
1,1
0 (I) resp. z
1,2
0 (I) = (2w2)
−1w3 z
2,2
0 (I). The
problem then reduces to f1(z1, z2) = 0 and f2(z1, z2) = 0, where z1 := z1,1, z2 := z2,2 and
f1(z1, z2) := w1
(
1− e−w1z1−(2w2)−1w23z2
)
− z1,
f2(z1, z2) := w2
(
1− e−(2w1)−1w23z1−w2z2 (1 + (2w1)−1w23z1 + w2z2))− z2.
Depending on the choice of the weights wi, i = 1, 2, 3, the system shows slightly different
behaviour, as illustrated in Figures 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c). In all cases, z0(I) = z
∗ 6= 0 which
determines a strictly positive lower bound on the final default fraction as shown in Example
5.1. Further in all three cases the type 2 subsystem is resilient. However, in 5(b) and 5(c)
the root sets for the function f2(z1, z2) shows a discontinuity even along the axis z1 = 0. Let
us elaborate on what this means. Along z1 = 0 the function f2(0, z2) describes contagion
within the resilient subsystem 2, not taking contagion between the subsystems into account.
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Figure 5: Plot of the root sets of the functions f1(z1, z2) (blue) and f2(z1, z2) (orange) for the
system with (a) w1 = 2, w2 = 1 and w3 = 2, (b) w1 = 2, w2 = 2 and w3 = 3/4 respectively (c)
w1 = 2, w2 = 2 and w3 = 1/2.
The discontinuity of set S0 on the axis z
1 = 0 then means the following: For small shocks on
subsystem 2 contagion is being contained. As the shock gets larger, however, the gap in S0 is
overcome and the final fraction of defaulted type 2 institutions experiences a jump above the
upper end of S0 on z
1 = 0. Considering the full picture again additionally to the small initial
shock, subsystem 2 experiences a shock by the positive fraction of defaulted type 1 institutions.
While in 5(c) their number is not sufficient to overcome the gap in S0 and the final fraction
of type 2 institutions stays small (but positive), in 5(b) with larger parameter w3 and hence
denser connection between the subsystems, the shock on subsystem 2 imposed by defaulted type
1 instututions is strong enough to overcome the gap and cause severe damage to subsystem 2.
The discontinuity phenomena has been observed in [33] for the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph.
Since all the main results of this article and the derivations in Example 5.1 are asymptotical,
we demonstrate the applicability for finite networks numerically: For each of the scenarios (a)-
(c) in Figure 5 we performed 104 simulations on networks of varying size n ∈ {100k : k ∈ [100]}
with 1% initially defaulted banks. The outcomes are plotted in Figure 6 together with the
theoretical asymptotic final default fraction (taking into account the initial default fraction of
1%). For case (a) except for 6 simulations at n = 100 all results lie considerably close to the
theoretical final fraction of ≈ 87.98% and their deviation becomes smaller the larger n grows.
For case (b) and n < 103 some of the simulations ended in final default fractions around 55%.
(Graphically these come from deviations of the hump (root set of f2, orange) in Figure 5(b)
such that it intersects with the root of f1 (blue)). For all other simulations and especially
for n ≥ 103, the simulation results clearly converge to the theoretical value of ≈ 94.25%. For
case (c), finally, some of the simulation outcomes for n ≤ 500 were close to 0 and few around
≈ 92.63% (the value if one plugs in the largest of the three joint roots into g). The majority
of the simulations (in particular for n ≥ 4000), however, resulted in final default fractions
close to the theoretical value of 50.02% and again deviations decrease as n increases and we
clearly confirm the theoretical convergence. Altogether we conclude that already for finite
networks of a few thousand vertices our asymptotic results are applicable with good accuracy.
In particular, what we learn from Example 5.1 is that in order to ensure resilience of a partic-
ular subsystem, one needs to completely prohibit links to other non-resilient subsystems. It is,
however, also possible that two subsystems which are resilient on their own form a non-resilient
global system once connected to each other. It is therefore an interesting regulatory question
how to ensure also resilience of a global system composed of various resilient subsystems. In
general for our model the answer to this question is provided by Theorem 4.2. However, in the
following example we state a more intuitive criterion.
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Figure 6: Plot of the simulation results on networks of varying size (blue) and the theoretical
asymptotic final default fraction (red) for the system with (a) w1 = 2, w2 = 1 and w3 = 2, (b)
w1 = 2, w2 = 2 and w3 = 3/4 respectively (c) w1 = 2, w2 = 2 and w3 = 1/2.
Example 5.2. Again, for simplicity assume that R = 1. Consider a financial network consisting
of T subnetworks (types) which shall satisfy the following 1-dimensional resilience conditions:
For each  > 0 there exists z > 0 such that for all z ∈ (0, z) and α ∈ [T ] it holds
 > E
[
W+,αW−,αP
(
Poi
(
W−,αz
)
= C − 1)1{A = α}] . (5.2)
Note that this condition implies E[W+,αP(Poi(W−,αz) ≥ C)|A = α] < 0 for all z small enough
and hence indeed it implies resilience of the subsystem by Theorem 4.2. In [20] explicit capital
requirements (i. e. a formula for C|A=α in dependence of W−,α|A=α) were derived for the case
of Pareto distributed weights (which are typically observed in real networks) which ensure (5.2).
Now further assume that there exists a constant K <∞ such that
W±,β|A=α ≤ KW±,α|A=α almost surely, (5.3)
for all α 6= β ∈ [T ], i. e. the tendency of institutions to develop links with institutions outside
their subnetwork is bounded by a constant multiple of their tendency to develop links with insti-
tutions within their subnetwork. In particular this is the case if the external weights are bounded
from above and the internal weights are bounded from below.
Replacing W±,β|A=α by KW±,α|A=α only makes the system less resilient (if the weights
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increase, the number of links increases and hence the total exposure of each institution). Hence
set W˜±,β|A=α = KW±,α|A=α for α 6= β and W˜±,α|A=α = W±,α|A=α. Now define v ∈ R[T ]×[T ]+
by vα,β = K1{α 6=β}, α, β ∈ [T ]. Then we derive that
E
[
W˜+,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vα,β
′
W˜−,β
′
)
P
(
Poi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W˜−,γzα,γ
)
= C − 1
)
1{A = α}
]
= E
[
W+,αW−,α(1 +K2(T − 1))P
(
Poi
(
W−,α
(
zα,α +K
∑
γ 6=α
zα,γ
))
= C − 1
)
1{A = α}
]
< (1 +K2(T − 1)) = vα,α(1 +K2(T − 1)),
for zα,α +K
∑
γ 6=α z
α,γ < z, and
E
[
W˜+,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vβ,β
′
W˜−,β
′
)
P
(
Poi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W˜−,γzβ,γ
)
= C − 1
)
1{A = β}
]
= E
[
KW+,βW−,β(1 +K2(T − 1))P
(
Poi
(
W−,β
(
zβ,β +K
∑
γ 6=β
zβ,γ
))
= C − 1
)
1{A = β}
]
< K(1 +K2(T − 1)) = vα,β(1 +K2(T − 1)),
for α 6= β and zβ,β +K∑γ 6=β zβ,γ < z. If we now choose  < (1 +K2(T − 1))−1, then
f˜α,β(δv) := E
[
W˜+,αP
(
Poi
(
δ
∑
γ∈[T ]
W˜−,γvβ,γ
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
− δvα,β < 0
for all δ > 0 small enough. It thus holds z∗ ≤ limδ→0+ δv = 0 and therefore S0 = {0}. We can
then apply Theorem 4.2 and obtain that the combined system is still resilient.
From a regulatory perspective it is hence enough to impose capital requirements described by
(5.2) and to restrict links between different subsystems in the sense of (5.3).
In our first two examples we concentrated on the (non-)resilience of multi-type networks.
For simplicity, we assumed that all edges carry the same exposure (R = 1). Another interesting
feature of our model, however, is that it allows for exposures that depend on the types of both
the creditor and the debtor bank. The following example shows that this can indeed make a
huge difference as compared to previous models in which exposures could only depend on the
size/degree/type of the creditor bank. It considers two very similar financial systems whose
only difference is that in one system exposures depend on both the creditor and debtor type
and in the other system they depend on the type of the creditor bank only. As a consequence
the first system will turn out to be non-resilient whereas the second one is resilient.
Example 5.3. Consider a network of size 2 ≤ n ∈ N in which (asymptotically) p = 1/3 of all
banks have type 1 and the remaining 1 − p = 2/3 banks have type 2. That is, T = 2. Further
assume that for each pair of vertices (i, j) ∈ [n]2 an edge from i to j shall be present with
probability 4/n. Edges between two banks of type 1 shall carry exposure 2 and all other edges
exposure 1. That is, if αi = 1, then w
±,2,1
i = w
±,1,2
i = 2 and w
±,1,1
i = w
±,2,2
i = 0. If αi = 2,
then w±,1,1i = w
±,1,2
i = 2 and w
±,2,1
i = w
±,2,2
i = 0. Finally, all banks shall have capital 2.
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Figure 7: Plot of the root sets of the functions f1(z1, z2) (blue) and f2(z1, z2) (orange) for the
system with (a) neighbor-dependent exposures respectively (b) neighbor-independent exposures.
Then similarly as for Example 5.1 the originally eight-dimensional system reduces to
f1(z1, z2) = 2pP
(
Poi(2z2) + 2Poi(2z1) ≥ 2)− z1,
f2(z1, z2) = 2(1− p)P (Poi(2(z1 + z2)) ≥ 2)− z2.
See Figure 7(a) for an illustration of the root sets of f1 and f2. This figure already shows that
z∗ 6= 0 and hence non-resilience by Theorem 4.7. Also for z1, z2 → 0, we can compute
∂f1
∂z1
(z1, z2) = 4pP
(
Poi(2z2) + 2Poi(2z1) ∈ {0, 1})− 1→ 4p− 1 = 1
3
> 0,
which rigorously proves that the type-1 subnetwork and then also the whole system is non-resilient
(cf. Example 5.1). Numerically one derives that z∗ ≈ (0.601, 1.153) and g(z∗) ≈ 0.877. In order
to test this prediction, we performed 104 simulations of financial networks of size n = 104 with
initial default probability 10−3. In only 5.32% of the simulations, we observed a resilient nature
in the sense that the simulated final default fraction was lower than 3%. All of the remaining
simulations ended with a final default fraction within [85.65%, 89.73%] and are hence of a non-
resilient nature. Averaging over the latter ones yields a mean final default fraction of 87.71%.
Now consider the following modified network: Instead of assigning exposure 2 to all links
between two type-1 banks and exposure 1 to all other links, this time assign exposure 2 with
probability p to any edge going to a type-1 bank (all other edges are assigned exposure 1). That
is, we keep the skeleton of the network but we redistribute the exposures in such a way that they
do only depend on the creditor bank and not on the debtor bank. The total number of edges
with exposure 2 stays the same (note that in the first network the type-1 banks accounted to a
fraction of p of all the debtor banks of type-1 banks). This can be achieved by assigning the
following new vertex-weights: w+,1,1i = w
+,2,1
i = 2 for all i ∈ [n]. Further, if αi = 1, then
w−,1,1i = w
−,1,2
i = 2(1 − p) and w−,2,1i = w−,2,2i = 2p. All other vertex-weights shall stay the
same. The new system then reduces to the following two functions, whose root sets are shown
in Figure 7(b):
f1(z1, z2) = 2pP
(
Poi(2(1− p)(z1 + z2)) + 2Poi(2p(z1 + z2)) ≥ 2)− z1,
f2(z1, z2) = 2(1− p)P (Poi(2(z1 + z2)) ≥ 2)− z2
Figure 7(b) shows that the root set of f2 is being shifted to the left, now starting off above the
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root set of f1. One can hence already expect that S0 = {0} and the new system is resilient. Also
more rigorously, as z1, z2 → 0, we derive that
∂f1
∂z1
(z1, z2) = 4p(1− p)P (Poi(2(1− p)(z1 + z2)) + 2Poi(2p(z1 + z2)) = 1)
+ 4p2P
(
Poi(2(1− p)(z1 + z2)) + 2Poi(2p(z1 + z2)) ∈ {0, 1})− 1
→ 4p2 − 1 = −5
9
,
∂f1
∂z2
(z1, z2) = 4p(1− p)P (Poi(2(1− p)(z1 + z2)) + 2Poi(2p(z1 + z2)) = 1)
+ 4p2P
(
Poi(2(1− p)(z1 + z2)) + 2Poi(2p(z1 + z2)) ∈ {0, 1})
→ 4p2 = 4
9
,
∂f2
∂z1
(z1, z2) = 4(1− p)P (Poi(2(z1 + z2)) = 1)→ 0,
∂f2
∂z2
(z1, z2) = 4(1− p)P (Poi(2(z1 + z2)) = 1)− 1→ −1.
The directional derivatives Dvf
1(0) and Dvf
2(0) thus exist for every v ∈ RV+. Choose then for
example v = (v1, v2) = (1, 1) such that Dvf
1(0) = −1/9 and Dvf2(0) = −1. From Lemma
3.3 we thus derive that z∗ = 0 and hence S0 = {0}. This allows us to apply Theorem 4.2 and
hence the modified system is indeed resilient. Again this can be validated numerically. On the
same skeleton as for the previous simulation but with random exposures as described above the
simulated final default fractions are now all within the interval [0.11%, 0.63%] with an average
of 0.20%. The system is hence indeed of a resilient nature.
Although Example 5.3 is too simple to model a real financial network, it still shows that
counterparty-dependent exposures may have a significant impact on the stability of the system.
In general it is also possible that they increase stability of the system, however.
6 Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs of our results in Sections 3 and 4. Theorem 3.4 will be
proved in two steps. At this the underlying ideas are similar to [19] but at a considerable number
of steps novel methods have to be used and we will particularly discuss them in detail. We use
the notation
[a, b] :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V
{z ∈ RV : ar,α,β ≤ zr,α,β ≤ br,α,β}
for the cuboid spanned by the vectors a and b in RV in the following. Further, let ζ ∈ RV+,0 be
defined by ζr,α,β := E[W+,r,α1{A = β}].
6.1 Proofs of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Existence of a smallest joint root zˆ ∈ [0, ζ] is ensured by the Knaster-
Tarski fixed point theorem. We now construct a joint root S0 3 z¯ ≤ zˆ which shows that
zˆ = z¯ ∈ S0, in particular: It holds f r,α,β(zˆ) = 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and then f r,α,β(z) ≤ 0 for
all zˆ ≥ z ∈ RV+,0 such that zr,α,β = zˆr,α,β by monotonicity of f r,α,β from Lemma 3.1. Consider
then the following sequence (zn)n∈N ⊂ RV+,0:
• z0 = 0
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• z1 = (z1,1,11 , 0, . . . , 0), where z1,1,11 ≥ 0 is the smallest possible value such that f1,1,1(z1) =
0. It is possible to find such z1,1,11 by the intermediate value theorem since f
1,1,1 is
continuous, f1,1,1(0) ≥ 0 and f1,1,1(zˆ1,1,1, 0, . . . , 0) ≤ 0. By Lemma 3.1, it then holds
f r,α,β(z1) ≥ f r,α,β(0) ≥ 0 for all (1, 1, 1) 6= (r, α, β) ∈ V . In particular, z1 ∈ S0.
• z2 = z1+(0, z1,1,22 , 0, . . . , 0), where z1,1,22 ≥ 0 is the smallest value such that f1,1,2(z2) = 0.
Again it is possible to find such z1,1,22 by the intermediate value theorem since f
1,1,2 is
continuous, f1,1,2(z1) ≥ 0 and f1,1,2(z1 + (0, zˆ1,1,2, 0, . . . , 0)) ≤ 0. Since z1 ∈ S0, by
Lemma 3.1 it then holds f r,α,β(z2) ≥ f r,α,β(z1) ≥ 0 for all (1, 1, 2) 6= (r, α, β) ∈ V . In
particular, z2 ∈ S0.
• zi, i ∈ {3, . . . , RT 2}, are found analogously, changing only the corresponding coordinate.
• zRT 2+1 = zRT 2 + (z1,1,1RT 2+1 − z1,1,1RT 2 , 0, . . . , 0), where z1,1,1RT 2+1 ≥ z1,1,1RT 2 is the smallest value
such that f1,1,1(zRT 2+1) = 0, which is again possible by the intermediate value theorem.
In particular, it still holds z1,1,1
RT 2+1
≤ zˆ1,1,1. As before also zRT 2+1 ∈ S0.
• Continue for zi, i ≥ RT 2 + 2.
The sequence (zn)n∈N constructed this way has the following properties: It is non-decreasing
in each coordinate and (zn)n∈N ⊂ S0. Further, it is bounded inside [0, zˆ]. Hence by monotone
convergence, each coordinate of zn converges and so z¯ = limn→∞ zn exists. Now suppose there
is (r, α, β) ∈ V such that f r,α,β(z¯) > 0. By continuity of f r,α,β then also f r,α,β(zn) >  for
some  > 0 and n large enough. This, however, is in contradiction with the construction of
the sequence (zn)n∈N since f r,α,β(zn) = 0 in every RT 2-th step. Hence f r,α,β(z¯) ≤ 0 for all
(r, α, β) ∈ V . Also z¯ ∈ S0, however, since this is a closed set. Hence f r,α,β(z¯) ≥ 0 for all
(r, α, β) ∈ V and altogether this shows that z¯ is a joint root of all functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V .
Now turn to the proof that z∗ ∈ S0 and it is a joint root of all functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V :
First define the following sets for each  > 0:
S() :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V
{z ∈ RV+,0 : f r,α,β(z) ≥ −}
Further denote by S0() the connected component of 0 in S(). By the same procedure as for zˆ
above, we now derive that there exists a smallest (componentwise) point zˆ() ∈ S0() such that
f r,α,β(zˆ()) = − for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . Clearly, zˆ() is non-decreasing in  (componentwise) and
hence z˜ := lim→0+ zˆ() exists (we will show that z˜ = z∗ in fact).
Now by monotonicity of S0(), we derive that zˆ(δ) ∈ S0(δ) ⊆ S0() for all δ ≤ . Since
S0() is a closed set, it must thus hold that also z˜ = limδ→0+ zˆ(δ) ∈ S0() for all  > 0 and
in particular, z˜ ∈ ⋂>0 S0(). Further, by continuity of f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V , we derive that⋂
>0 S0() ⊆
⋂
>0 S() ⊆ S. Moreover,
⋂
>0 S0() is the intersection of a chain of connected,
compact sets in the Hausdorff space RV and it is hence a connected, compact set itself. Since
it further contains 0, we can then conclude that
⋂
>0 S0() ⊆ S0 and thus z˜ ∈ S0.
We now want to show that z ≤ z˜ componentwise for arbitrary z ∈ S0. This clearly proves
z˜ = z∗. It thus suffices to show S0 ⊂ [0, zˆ()]. Then z ≤ zˆ() and z ≤ lim→0+ zˆ() = z˜. Hence
assume that S0 6⊂ [0, zˆ()]. By connectedness of S0 we find z¯ ∈ S0 with z¯r,α,β ≤ zˆr,α,β() for all
(r, α, β) ∈ V and equality for at least one coordinate. W. l. o. g. let this coordinate be (1, 1, 1).
By monotonicity of f1,1,1 with respect to zr,α,β for every (r, α, β) 6= (1, 1, 1), we thus derive that
f1,1,1(z¯) ≤ f1,1,1(zˆ()) = −.
However, we also assumed that z¯ ∈ S0 and hence f1,1,1(z¯) ≥ 0, a contradiction.
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Finally, we obtain that f r,α,β(z∗) = f r,α,β(z˜) = lim→0+ f r,α,β(zˆ()) = lim→0+(−) = 0, by
continuity of f r,α,β. Hence z∗ is in fact a joint root of all the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V .
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Note that it is sufficient to construct a sequence (zn)n∈N ⊂ RV+ such that
limn→∞ zn = z¯ and f r,α,β(zn) < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V , n ∈ N. By monotonicity of f r,αβ from
Lemma 3.1 it then follows that z∗ ≤ zn and hence z∗ ≤ z¯. If condition 1. is satisfied, we get
limn→∞ nf r,α,β
(
z¯ + n−1v
)
= Dvf
r,α,β(z¯) < 0 and we can hence choose zn := z¯ + n
−1v.
If condition 2. is satisfied, note that by Fubini’s theorem for n > ∆−1 we derive
f r,α,β
(
z¯ +
1
n
v
)
=
∫ 1
n
0
(
− vr,α,β +
∑
r′∈[R]
E
[
W+,r,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′W−,r
′,β′
)
1{A = β}
× P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γ
(
z¯s,β,γ + δvs,β,γ
))
∈{C − r′, . . . , C − 1}
)])
dδ
≤ −n−1(1− κ)vr,α,β
and lim supn→∞ nf r,α,β
(
z¯ + n−1v
) ≤ (1−κ)vr,α,β < 0. Thus choose zn := z¯+n−1v again.
6.2 Proof of the Main Result for Finitary Weights
In this section, we consider the special case that the vertex weights wr,α,βi and capitals ci can
only take values in a finite set. To formalize this, consider the following definition:
Definition 6.1 (Finitary regular vertex sequence). A regular vertex sequence denoted by
(w−,r,α,w+,r,α, c,α) is called finitary if there exist J ∈ N and (w˜−,1,1j , . . . , w˜+,R,Tj ) ∈ R2RT+,0 ,
j ∈ [J ], as well as cmax ∈ N0 such that for all n ∈ N and i ∈ [n], there exists j = j(n, i) ∈ [J ]
such that w±,r,αi (n) = w˜
±,r,α
j and ci(n) ∈ [cmax] ∪ {0,∞}.
That is, in a finitary system there is a partition of the set of all institutions into TJ(cmax+2)
sets. In particular, in this case all weights w±,r,αi are bounded from above by some constant
w ∈ R+ and hence by Dominated Convergence we can compute the partial derivatives of f r,α,β:
∂f r,α,β
∂zr′,α′,β′
(zˆ) = −δr,r′δα,α′δβ,β′ + δβ,α′E
[
W+,r,αW−,r
′,β′1{A = β}
× P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ
)
∈ {C − r′, . . . , C − 1}
)]
,
where δa,b := 1{a = b}. Hence for any vector v ∈ RV , the directional derivative of f r,α,β in
direction v is given by the following continuous expression:
Dvf
r,α,β(zˆ) = −vr,α,β +
∑
r′∈[R]
E
[
W+,r,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′W−,r
′,β′
)
1{A = β}
× P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ
)
∈ {C − r′, . . . , C − 1}
)]
We can then prove the following asymptotic results for the final default fraction in the network.
Proposition 6.2. Consider a financial system described by a finitary regular vertex sequence
and let zˆ be the smallest joint root of the functions {f r,α,β}(r,α,β)∈V . Then it holds that
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n−1|Dn| ≥ g(zˆ) + op(1). If additionally there exists v ∈ RV+ such that Dvf r,α,β(zˆ) < 0 for
all (r, α, β) ∈ V , then n−1|Dn| = g(zˆ) + op(1).
See Figure 2(a) for an example where such v ∈ RV+ exists respectively Figure 2(b) for an
example where it does not. Theorem 6.3 below will analyze systems of the latter type as well.
Proof. We begin by proving the lower bound: As in [19] and [20] we switch to a sequential
default contagion process. The idea is to collect defaulted institutions and instead of exposing
them all at once (as in (2.2)), only select one defaulted institution uniformly at random in each
round t ≥ 1 and expose it to its neighbors (draw edges). Using the finitary assumption, it is
then sufficient to keep track of the following sets and quantities during the default process:
Uα(t) := {i ∈ [n] : αi = α and i is defaulted but unexposed at time t} ,
Sαj,m,l(t) :=
{
i ∈ [n] : αi = α,w±,r,βi = w˜±,r,βj , ci = m and i has total exposure of l at time t
}
,
uα(t) := |Uα(t)| , cαj,m,l(t) :=
∣∣Sαj,m,l(t)∣∣ , wr,α,β(t) := ∑
i∈Uβ(t)
w+,r,αi .
Let h(t) := (uα(t), cαj,m,l(t), w
r,α,β(t)) and H(t) = (h(s))s≤t. Then for n large enough such that
all pri,j < R
−1 (possible by finitary weights), the expected evolution of the system at time t is
E
[
cαj,m,l(t+ 1)− cαj,m,l(t)
∣∣ H(t)]
=
1∑
β∈[T ] uβ(t)
∑
β∈[T ]
∑
v∈Uβ(t)
∑
r∈[R]
 ∑
i∈Sαj,m,l−r(t)
w+,r,αv w
−,r,β
i
n
−
∑
i∈Sαj,m,l(t)
w+,r,αv w
−,r,β
i
n

=
∑
r∈[R]
∑
β∈[T ]w
r,α,β(t)w˜−,r,βj∑
β∈[T ] uβ(t)
cαj,m,l−r(t)− cαj,m,l(t)
n
.
E [uα(t+ 1)− uα(t) | H(t)] = − u
α(t)∑
β∈[T ] uβ(t)
+
∑
j,m
∑
r∈[R]
∑
β∈[T ]w
r,α,β(t)w˜−,r,βj∑
β∈[T ] uβ(t)
m−1∑
l=m−r
cαj,m,l(t)
n
,
E
[
wr,α,β(t+ 1)− wr,α,β(t)
∣∣∣ H(t)]
= − w
r,α,β(t)∑
γ∈[T ] uγ(t)
+
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
s∈[R]
∑
γ∈[T ]w
s,β,γ(t)w˜−,s,γj∑
γ∈[T ] uγ(t)
m−1∑
l=m−s
cβj,m,l(t)
n
.
The expressions on the right-hand side are all Lipschitz functions of uα(t), wr,α,β(t), cαj,m,l(t) as
long as
∑
β∈[T ] u
β(t) is bounded away from zero. All the remaining conditions in Wormalds
theorem [39] can be checked by similar means as in [19]. We can thus uniformly approximate
n−1cαj,m,l(t) = γ
α
j,m,l(n
−1t) + op(1), (6.1)
n−1uα(t) = να(n−1t) + op(1), (6.2)
n−1wr,α,β(t) = µr,α,β(n−1t) + op(1), (6.3)
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where the functions γαj,m,l(τ), ν
α(τ) and µr,α,β(τ) are defined as the unique solution of
d
dτ
γαj,m,l(τ) =
∑
r∈[R]
∑
β∈[T ] µ
r,α,β(τ)w˜−,r,βj∑
β∈[T ] νβ(τ)
(
γαj,m,l−r(τ)− γαj,m,l(τ)
)
, (6.4)
d
dτ
να(τ) = − ν
α(τ)∑
β∈[T ] νβ(τ)
+
∑
j,m
∑
r∈[R]
∑
β∈[T ] µ
r,α,β(τ)w˜−,r,βj∑
β∈[T ] νβ(τ)
m−1∑
l=m−r
γαj,m,l(τ), (6.5)
d
dτ
µr,α,β(τ) = − µ
r,α,β(τ)∑
γ∈[T ] νγ(τ)
+
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
s∈[R]
∑
γ∈[T ] µ
s,α,γ(τ)w˜−,s,γj∑
γ∈[T ] νγ(τ)
m−1∑
l=m−r
γαj,m,l(τ). (6.6)
Approximations (6.1)-(6.3) hold uniformly for t/n < τˆ := inf{τ ∈ R+,0 :
∑
β∈[T ] ν
β(τ) = 0}.
For zr,α,β(τ) :=
∫ τ
0 µ
r,α,β(s)/
∑
γ∈[T ] ν
γ(s)ds, an implicit solution of (6.4)-(6.6) is given by
γαj,m,l(τ) = P(W±,r,α = w˜
±,r,α
j , C = m,A = α)P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
β∈[T ]
w˜−,s,βj z
s,α,β(τ)
)
= l
)
,
να(τ) = E
[
P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
β∈[T ]
W−,s,βzs,α,β(τ)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = α}
]
−
∫ τ
0
να(s)∑
β∈[T ] νβ(s)
,
µr,α,β(τ) = E
[
W+,r,αP
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ(τ)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
− zr,α,β(τ).
In particular, note that
∑
α∈[T ] ν
α(τ) = g(z(τ)) − τ and µr,α,β(τ) = f r,α,β(z(τ)). Thus for
τ < τˆ , it holds f r,α,β(z(τ)) = n−1wr,α,β(bτnc) + op(1) ≥ 0 + op(1) and by letting n → ∞, it
follows f r,α,β(z(τ)) ≥ 0. By continuity of z(τ) and z(0) = 0, hence z(τ) ∈ S0. Further,
f r,α,β(z(τ)) = µr,α,β(τ) = n−1wr,α,β(bτnc) + op(1) ≤ n−1wuβ(bτnc) + op(1) = wνβ(τ) + op(1)
and as n→∞, f r,α,β(z(τ)) ≤ wνβ(τ).
As τ → τˆ , ∑β∈[T ] νβ(τ) → 0 and hence by continuity of z(τ), f r,α,β(z(τˆ)) = 0 for all
(r, α, β) ∈ V . Again by continuity of z(τ) and closedness of S0, we then conclude that z(τˆ) ≥ zˆ.
In particular,
g(zˆ) ≤ g(z(τˆ)) = lim
τ→τˆ
g(z(τ)) = lim
τ→τˆ
∑
α∈[T ]
να(τ) + τ = τˆ . (6.7)
Hence, we are left with showing that tˆ/n ≥ τˆ + op(1) in order to prove the first part of the
theorem, where tˆ denotes the first time that
∑
α∈[T ] u
α(t) = 0. Define Xn := (bτˆnc ∧ tˆ)/n− τˆ .
Then tˆ/n ≥ τˆ +Xn. Further, for  > 0 and n large enough such that τˆ −bτˆnc/n ≤ , we obtain
P(|Xn| > ) = P(τˆ − tˆ/n > ) ≤ P
( ∑
α∈[T ]
να(tˆ/n) >
1
2
min
τ∈[0,τˆ−]
∑
α∈[T ]
να(τ), tˆ/n < τˆ
)
,
using continuity of
∑
α∈[T ] ν
α(τ). Let now (Yn)n∈N such that
∣∣∣∑α∈[T ] uα(t)/n− να(t/n)∣∣∣ ≤ Yn
and Yn = op(1) (existence of (Yn)n∈N ensured by (6.2)). Since
∑
α∈[T ] u
α(tˆ) = 0, we conclude
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that
P(|Xn| > ) ≤ P
(
Yn >
1
2
min
τ∈[0,τˆ−]
∑
α∈[T ]
να(τ)
)
→ 0, as n→∞.
In order to prove the second part, we first want to show that the existence of v implies that
in fact z(τˆ) = zˆ. To this end, assume that z(τˆ) 6= zˆ. Then there exists (r, α, β) ∈ V and δ > 0
such that zr,α,β(τˆ) > zˆr,α,β +δvr,α,β. Without loss of generality assume that zr,α,β(τ) is the first
coordinate that reaches zˆr,α,β + δvr,α,β, that is there exists τδ ∈ [0, τˆ ] such that z(τδ) ≤ zˆ + δv
componentwise and zr,α,β(τδ) = zˆ
r,α,β + δvr,α,β. But by Dvf
r,α,β(zˆ) < 0 and continuity of
Dvf
r,α,β(z), we then derive for δ > 0 small enough that 0 > f r,α,β(zˆ + δv) ≥ f r,α,β(z(τδ)),
where we used monotonicity of f r,α,β from Lemma 3.1. This contradicts that f r,α,β(z(τ)) ≥ 0
for all τ ∈ [0, τˆ ] and hence it must hold that z(τˆ) = zˆ. In particular, g(zˆ) = τˆ (cf. (6.7)).
The difficulty in the following is that the system is only described by the functions γαj,m,l(τ),
να(τ) and µr,α,β(τ) as long as τ < τˆ , the first time at which
∑
α∈[T ] ν
α(τ) = 0. Wormald’s
theorem makes no statement about the system at or after τˆ , however. The idea is hence the
following: We let τ be the first time at which µ
r,α,β(τ) ≤ vr,α,β for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and choose
a sequence (n)n∈N ⊂ R+ such that n → 0 as n→∞. We then consider the cascade process as
before for the first bτnnc steps and we show that the number of remaining defaults Rn divided
by n converges to 0 in probability as n→∞. In particular, this will show that
n−1|Dn| = n−1tˆ = n−1(bτnnc+Rn) ≤ τn + n−1Rn ≤ τˆ + op(1) = g(zˆ) + op(1).
In order to show n−1Rn = op(1), we will expose the defaulted banks round by round as in
(2.2), i. e. we expose the banks in
⋃
α∈[T ] U
α(bτnnc) at once and so on. However, banks with
w+,r,αi = 0 for all r ∈ [R] and α ∈ [T ] will never infect any new banks. Thus, we only need to con-
sider banks with
∑
r∈[R]
∑
α∈[T ]w
+,r,α
i > 0 in the following. Since we are in a finitary setting, this
means that there exists w0 > 0 such that
∑
r∈[R]
∑
α∈[T ]w
+,r,α
i ≥ w0 for all banks. Taking into
account also banks with total out-weight of zero only causes an extra bounded factor for Rn.
For each solvent bank at step bτnnc there are two possible ways to default: Either there is
one exposure to a defaulted bank that is larger than the remaining capital at step bτnnc (the
bank defaults directly) or there are at least two exposures to defaulted banks that add up to an
amount larger than the remaining capital (the bank defaults indirectly). Therefore, for α ∈ [T ]
and l ≥ 1 we define the following sets:
Dαl = Dαl (τn) = {i ∈ [n] : αi = α and i defaults directly in the l-th round after step bτnnc}
Iαl = Iαl (τn) = {i ∈ [n] : αi = α and i defaults indirectly in the l-th round after step bτnnc}
Further, let T αl = Dα ∪ Iα. In particular, Rn =
∑
α∈[T ]
∑
l≥1 |T αl (τn)|. Further, the following
quantities will play an important role:
Dr,α,βl =
∑
i∈Dβl
w+,r,αi , I
r,α,β
l =
∑
i∈Iβl
w+,r,αi and T
r,α,β
l =
∑
i∈T βl
w+,r,αi , l ≥ 1, (r, α, β) ∈ V
We now exploit again the assumption that Dvf
r,α,β(zˆ) < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . Also
recall that the expression Dvf
r,α,β(z) is continuous in z since the weights are assumed finitary.
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Further z(τ) is continuous in τ . Hence for  > 0 small enough (i. e. z(τ) close to zˆ), it holds
0 > Dvf
r,α,β(z(τ))
=
∑
r′∈[R]
E
[
W+,r,α
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′W−,r
′,β′
)
× P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ(τ)
)
∈ {C − r′, . . . , C − 1}
)
1{A = β}
]
− vr,α,β
=
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
r′∈[R]
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′w˜−,r
′,β′
j
)
r′∑
s=1
γβj,m,m−s(τ)− vr,α,β.
We can hence find c1 < 1 such that for all (r, α, β) ∈ V it holds
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
r′∈[R]
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′w˜−,r
′,β′
j
)
r′∑
s=1
γβj,m,m−s(τ) ≤ c1vr,α,β.
By (6.1) and possibly slightly increasing c1, we then derive that
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
r′∈[R]
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′w˜−,r
′,β′
j
)
r′∑
s=1
cβj,m,m−s(bτnc)
n
≤ c1vr,α,β
on a σ(h(bτnc))-measurable set Ωn such that limn→∞ P(Ωn) = 1 for every  > 0. Further, by
the definition of τ and (6.3), we can choose Ω

n in such a way that n
−1wr,α,β(bτnc) ≤ 2vr,α,β
holds on Ωn for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . We can then compute on Ωn
n−1E
[
Dr,α,β1
∣∣∣h(bτnc)] ≤∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
m−1∑
l=0
cβj,m,l(bτnc)
n
∑
β′∈[T ]
∑
v∈Uβ′ (bτnc)
R∑
r′=m−l
wr
′,+,β
v w˜
−,r′,β′
j
n
≤ 2
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
m−1∑
l=0
cβj,m,l(bτnc)
n
∑
β′∈[T ]
R∑
r′=m−l
vr
′,β,β′w˜−,r
′,β′
j ≤ 2c1vr,α,β ,
n−1E
[
Ir,α,β1
∣∣∣h(bτnc)] ≤ n−1∑
j,m
m−1∑
l=0
∑
i∈Sβj,m,l(bτnc)
w
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
∑
v∈Uβ′ (bτnc)
R∑
r′=m−l
wr
′,+,β
v w
−,r′,β′
i
n
)2
≤ w
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
R∑
r′=0
wr
′,β,β′(bτnc)
n
w
)2
≤ C2,
where C := 4T 2(R + 1)2w3‖v‖2∞. In particular, for  > 0 small enough we find c2 ∈ (0, 1− c1)
such that C2 ≤ 2c2vr,α,β for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and hence on Ωn it holds that
n−1E
[
T r,α,β1
∣∣∣h(bτnc)] = n−1E[Dr,α,β1 ∣∣∣h(bτnc)]+ n−1E[Ir,α,β1 ∣∣∣h(bτnc)] ≤ 2(c1 + c2)vr,α,β.
Let then c := c1 + c2 ∈ (0, 1). We continue inductively: Assume that on Ωn it holds for l ≥ 1
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that n−1E
[
T r,α,βl
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)] ≤ 2clvr,α,β. We then derive on Ωn that
n−1E
[
Dr,α,βl+1
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)] = n−1∑
j,m
m−1∑
l=0
∑
i∈Sβj,m,l(bτnc)
w+,r,αi P
(
i ∈ Dβl+1
∣∣∣ h(bτnc))
≤
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
m−1∑
l=0
cβj,m,l(bτnc)
n
E
 ∑
β′∈[T ]
∑
v∈T β′l
R∑
r′=m−l
wr
′,+,β
v w˜
−,r′,β′
j
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ h(bτnc)

=
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
m−1∑
l=0
cβj,m,l(bτnc)
n
∑
β′∈[T ]
R∑
r′=m−l
w˜−,r
′,β′
j n
−1E
[
T r
′,β,β′
l
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)]
≤ 2cl
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
∑
r′∈[R]
( ∑
β′∈[T ]
vr
′,β,β′w˜−,r
′,β′
j
)
r′∑
s=1
cβj,m,m−s(bτnc)
n
≤ 2clc1vr,α,β,
n−1E
[
Ir,α,βl+1
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)] = n−1∑
j,m
m−1∑
l=0
∑
i∈Sβj,m,l(bτnc)
w+,r,αi P
(
i ∈ Iβl+1
∣∣∣ h(bτnc))
≤
∑
j,m
w˜+,r,αj
m−1∑
l=0
cβj,m,l(bτnc)
n
 ∑
β′∈[T ]
R∑
r′=m−l
w˜−,r
′,β′
j n
−1E
[
T r
′,β,β′
l
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)]

×
 ∑
β′∈[T ]
R∑
r′=m−l
w˜−,r
′,β′
j n
−1∑
k≤l
E
[
T r
′,β,β′
k
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)]

≤ w
(
2T (R+ 1)wclvr
′,β,β′
)(
2T (R+ 1)w
∑
k≤l
ckvr
′,β,β′
)
≤ Ccl 1
1− c
2
Now choose  > 0 small enough such that even C1−c
2 ≤ 2c2vr,α,β and conclude that on Ωn
n−1E
[
T r,α,βl+1
∣∣∣ h(bτnc)] = n−1E [Dr,α,βl+1 ∣∣∣ h(bτnc)]+ n−1E [Ir,α,βl+1 ∣∣∣ h(bτnc)] ≤ 2cl+1vr,α,β,
n−1
∑
α∈[T ]
∑
l≥1
E [ |T αl | | h(bτnc)] ≤ n−1
∑
α∈[T ]
∑
l≥1
E
[ ∑
i∈T αl
∑
r∈[R]
∑
γ∈[T ]w
+,r,γ
i
w0
∣∣∣∣∣h(bτnc)
]
= w−10 n
−1 ∑
r∈[R]
∑
α,γ∈[T ]
∑
l≥1
E
[
T r,γ,αl
∣∣ h(bτnc)]
≤ 2w−10 (R+ 1)T 2
1
1− c‖v‖∞.
Consider now again the sequence (n)n∈N from before and let , δ > 0 arbitrary. For n large
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enough such that n ≤ , we derive (using Markov’s inequality in the penultimate step)
P
(
n−1Rn ≥ δ
) ≤ P(n−1 ∑
α∈[T ]
∑
l≥1
|T αl (τ)| ≥ δ
)
≤ E
[
δ−1n−1
∑
α∈[T ]
∑
l≥1
E
[|T αl (τ)| ∣∣h(bτnc)]
]
≤ 2δ−1w−10 (R+ 1)T 2
1
1− c‖v‖∞ + (1− P(Ω

n)).
Choosing  small enough and n large enough, this quantity becomes arbitrarily small. Hence,
n−1Rn = op(1) and this finishes the proof as explained above.
Theorem 6.3. Consider a financial system described by a finitary regular vertex sequence and
let zˆ and z∗ be the smallest resp. largest joint root in S0 of the functions {f r,α,β}(r,α,β)∈V . Then
g(zˆ) + op(1) ≤ n−1|Dn| ≤ g(z∗) + op(1). In particular, if zˆ = z∗, then n−1|Dn| = g(zˆ) + op(1).
The idea for the proof of Theorem 6.3 is to apply a small further shock to the financial
system such that the second statement in Proposition 6.2 becomes applicable. That is, we let
each solvent bank in the system default independently with probability  > 0 and denote the
analogues of f r,α,β, g, zˆ and z∗ by f r,α,β , g, zˆ() respectively z∗(). That is,
f r,α,β (z) = 
(
E
[
W+,r,α1{A = β}]− zr,α,β)+ (1− )f r,α,β(z), g(z) = + (1− )g(z).
We can assume in the following that E [W+,r,α1{A = β}] > 0 and hence f r,α,β (z) > f r,α,β(z) for
all z, since otherwise f r,α,β(z) = −zr,α,β and we can simply leave out the (r, α, β)-component
in the proof. The following lemma describes z∗() for small :
Lemma 6.4. The function z∗ : R+,0 → RV+,0 is right-continuous and monotonically increasing
in each component. In particular, the derivative (z∗)′() exists for Lebesgue-almost every  > 0
and z∗()− z∗ ≥ ∫ 0 (z∗)′(ξ)dξ componentwise.
Proof. For every z ∈ S0 and  > 0 it holds f r,α,β (z) ≥ f r,α,β(z) ≥ 0 and hence S0 ⊆ S0(), where
S0() denotes the analogue of S0 for the additionally shocked case. In particular, z
∗ ∈ S0()
and hence z∗ ≤ z∗() componentwise. The same argument shows that z∗(1) ≤ z∗(2) for any
1 ≤ 2 and hence z∗() is monotonically increasing in each component.
In particular, lim→0+ z∗() exists and lim→0+ z∗() ∈
⋂
>0 S0(). Now let δ > 0. By
continuity of f r,α,β (z) with respect to  and z, it holds f r,α,β(z) ≥ f r,α,β (z) − δ for  small
enough and all z in the compact set [0, ζ]. Hence for z ∈ ⋂>0 S0(), we obtain f r,α,β(z) ≥ −δ
for every δ > 0 and so
⋂
>0 S0() ⊆ S. However, since
⋂
>0 S0() is the intersection of a chain
of connected, compact sets in the Hausdorff space RV , it is itself a connected, compact set.
Since further 0 ∈ ⋂>0 S0(), we thus derive that ⋂>0 S0() = S0. That is, lim→0+ z∗() ∈ S0
and hence lim→0+ z∗() = z∗. The same arguments show that limh→0+ z∗( + h) = z∗() for
every  > 0, hence proving right-continuity of z∗().
A classical result for derivatives of monotone functions (see [38, Theorem 7.21] for instance)
then yields the existence of (z∗)′ almost everywhere and
z∗()− z∗ ≥ lim
h→0−
z∗(+ h)− lim
h→0+
z∗(h) ≥
∫ 
0
(z∗)′(ξ)dξ.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. As outlined above, in order to reduce this general setting to the special
case from Proposition 6.2, we apply an additional small shock to the system. That is, if we
can find a vector v() ∈ R+ such that Dv()f r,α,β (zˆ()) < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V , then applying
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Proposition 6.2, we derive for the final default fraction n−1|Dn| in the additionally shocked
system
n−1|Dn| ≤ g(zˆ()) + op(1) ≤ g(z∗()) + op(1) ≤ + g(z∗()) + op(1).
Hence for arbitrary δ > 0 and  = (δ) > 0 small enough, we derive
P
(
n−1|Dn| − g(z∗) > δ
) ≤ P (n−1|Dn| − (+ g(z∗()) > δ/2)→ 0, as n→∞
and thus
n−1|Dn| ≤ g(z∗) + op(1).
So let us show the existence of the vectors v(): By Lemma 6.4 we know that (z∗)′() exists
almost everywhere and that
∫ 
0 (z
∗)′(ξ)dξ ≤ z∗()− z∗ <∞. By the integrability, we can hence
find a sequence (n)n∈N ⊂ (0, 1) such that n → 0 as n→∞ and for each n it holds
(z∗)′(n) < −1n (ζ − z∗ − δ1)
componentwise, where 0 < δ < ζr,α,β − (z∗)r,α,β for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈
RV+. This bound can be achieved with the same n for each component, considering the sum∑
(r,α,β)∈V ((z
∗)r,α,β)′(ξ) which is still integrable. With
0 = f r,α,β (z
∗()) = (1− )f r,α,β(z∗()) + 
(
E
[
W+,r,α1{A = β}]− (z∗)r,α,β()) ,
we then derive that
d
d
f r,α,β(z∗())
∣∣
=n
= − 1
(1− n)2
(
ζr,α,β − (z∗)r,α,β(n)
)
+
n
1− n
d
d
(z∗)r,α,β()
∣∣
=n
< − 1
1− n
(
ζr,α,β − (z∗)r,α,β(n)− n d
d
(z∗)r,α,β()
∣∣
=n
)
< − 1
1− n
(
(z∗)r,α,β + δ − (z∗)r,α,β(n)
)
< 0
for n large enough such that (z∗)r,α,β(n) < (z∗)r,α,β + δ. On the other hand, however,
d
d
f r,α,β(z∗())
∣∣
=n
= Dv(n)f
r,α,β(z∗(n)) ≥ Dv(n)f r,α,βn (z∗(n)),
where v(n) := (z
∗)′(n). Hence altogether,
Dv(n)f
r,α,β
n (z
∗(n)) < 0.
In fact, it also holds that
vr,α,β(n) ≥ lim
h→0
E
[
W+,r,α1{A = β}P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γ(z∗)s,β,γ(n + h)
)
< C
)]
≥ E
[
W+,r,α1{A = β}P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γζs,β,γ
)
< C
)]
> 0,
using that f r,α,βn (z
∗(n)) = f
r,α,β
n+h
(z∗(n+h)) = 0. The proof is hence finished, if zˆ(n) = z∗(n).
Otherwise, note the following: For each δ > 0 it holds f r,α,βn (zˆ(n + δ)) < f
r,α,β
n+δ
(zˆ(n + δ)) = 0.
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By monotonicity of f r,α,βn from Lemma 3.1, we derive that z
∗(n) ≤ zˆ(n+δ) ≤ z∗(n+δ). Hence
as δ → 0, using that z∗(n+δ)→ z∗(n) by Lemma 6.4, we conclude that also zˆ(n+δ)→ z∗(n)
as δ → 0. Thus we derive that for δn > 0 small enough, it holds Dv(n)f r,α,βn+δn(zˆ(n+δn)) < 0 by
continuity of Dvf
r,α,β
 (z) w. r. t.  and z. Hence apply Proposition 6.2 to the financial systems
additionally shocked by n + δn and choose vectors v(n) for the directional derivative.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
In the previous section we derived an explicit asymptotic expression for the final default fraction
if in our model we choose vertex-weights only from a finite set. While this gives a first important
insight into the behavior of large financial networks, it is not possible to model heavy tailed
degree distributions as observed for real financial networks by bounded vertex-weights. Theorem
3.4 hence extends Theorem 6.3 to the case of general (non-finitary) regular vertex sequences.
The outline for the rest of this section is the following: We want to approximate the general
regular vertex sequence by two sequences of finitary vertex sequences such that one of them
describes a system that experiences less defaults and the other one experiences more defaults.
To this end, we first construct the corresponding limiting distribution functions {FAk }k∈N re-
spectively {FBk }k∈N and then investigate the finitary systems with help of Theorem 6.3.
Let D∞ :=
(
R[R]×[T ]+,0
)2 × N0 × [T ] and for (r, α, β) ∈ V , (z,x,y, `,m) ∈ RV+,0 ×D∞, let
hr,α,β1 (z,x,y, `,m) := y
r,αψ`
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
x1,γz1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
xR,γzR,β,γ
)
1{m = β},
h2(z,x,y, `,m) :=
∑
β∈[T ]
ψ`
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
x1,γz1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
xR,γzR,β,γ
)
1{m = β},
where as before ψ`(x1, . . . , xR) := P(
∑
r∈[R] rPoi(xr) ≥ `). Note that although D∞ does not
contain
(
R[R]×[T ]+,0
)2×{∞}×[T ], it holds that f r,α,β(z) = ∫D∞ hr,α,β1 (z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m)−
zr,α,β and g(z) =
∫
D∞ h2(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m), for F the limiting distribution of the
weights, capital and type as given in Definition 2.3. This is because ψ∞(x1, . . . , xR) = 0. Let
then Z := [0, ζ ] and H := {h2} ∪
⋃
(r,α,β)∈V {hr,α,β1 }.
As a first approximation of F , we choose the discretizations
FAj (x,y, `,m) := F
(djxe
j
,
djye
j
, `,m
)
, FBj (x,y, `,m) := F
(bjxc
j
,
bjyc
j
, `,m
)
for j ∈ N, where d·e and b·c shall be applied componentwise. That is, the sequences {FAj }j∈N
and {FBj }j∈N approximate F from above respectively below and the approximations become
finer as j increases. Since every h ∈ H is continuous in z, x and y, it is easy to obtain (cf. [19])
that for each k ∈ N there exists jk large enough such that for all j ≥ jk it holds∣∣∣∣∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFA,Bj (x,y, `,m)−
∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k−1
simultaneously for all z ∈ Z, where Dk := {(x,y, `,m) : xr,α ≤ k, yr,α ≤ k, ` ≤ k} ⊂ D∞. We
denote F
A
k := F
A
jk
and F
B
k := F
B
jk
in the following.
By construction, the distribution functions F
A,B
k clearly correspond to discrete weight se-
quences that can be obtained from the original regular vertex sequence by adjusting weights
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upward respectively downward. However, F
A,B
k (potentially) still assigns mass to infinitely
many weights and capitals. For the case of F
A
k , we can overcome this issue by setting
FAk (x,y, `,m) :=
{
F
A
k (x ∧ k,y ∧ k, ` ∧ k,m), if ` <∞,
1, else,
where · ∧ k denotes componentwise truncation at k. That is, if the capital or one of the weights
of some bank in the system exceeds k (we call this bank large in the following), then in the
approximating finitary system described by FAk , this bank’s weights are all set to 0 and its capital
is increased to∞ (cf. [19] for a rigorous definition of the approximating vertex sequences). Note
that the type of each bank stays the same. Clearly, this further reduces defaults in the system
in the sense that if we couple the original system with the finitary approximating system, then
the final default fraction n−1
∣∣(DAk )n∣∣ is stochastically dominated by n−1 |Dn| for all k ∈ N.
If we wanted to apply exactly the same idea also to F
B
k , we would need to set all weights of
large banks to ∞, which is not possible by the definition of a finitary regular vertex sequence.
Still it will be possible to adjust weights and capitals of large banks to finitely many values such
that the final default fraction in the finitary approximating system stochastically dominates
n−1|Dn|. To this end, let γβk :=
∫
Dck
1{m = β}dF (x,y, `,m), where Dck := D∞\Dk, and
wr,α,βk :=
2
(
γβk
)−1 ∫
Dck
yr,α1{m = β}dF (x,y, `,m) ≥ 2k, if γβk > 0,
2k, if γβk = 0.
Let then FBk be given by F
B
k on Dk. By this definition we know that it holds F
B
k (k, . . . , k, β) =
F (k, . . . , k, β) for each β ∈ [T ] and hence P(A = β,C < ∞) − P(ABk = β,CBk < ∞) = γβk . We
can thus assign mass γβk to the points (0,wk, 0, β). That is, if a large bank of type β originally
has finite capital, then its approximated capital is set to 0 (it initially defaults), its in-weights
are set to 0 and its out-weights are set to wr,α,βk (again cf. [19] for a rigorous definition of the
approximating vertex sequences). As before, their type does not change. Finally, we assign the
remaining mass P(A = β,C =∞) to the points (0,0,∞, β) for each β ∈ [T ].
By construction, all large banks are initially defaulted in the approximating finitary system.
Also all the weights of small banks are increased as compared to the original system. To
show that there occur more defaults in the approximating system than in the original one
(i. e. n−1
∣∣(DBk )n∣∣ stochastically dominates n−1|Dn|), all that is left to show is that for each
r ∈ [R] the total r-out-weight of the large banks with respect to each type α ∈ [T ] in the
approximating system is larger than in the original one. But the total r-out-weight of the large
banks with respect to type α is given by
n
∑
β∈[T ]
wr,α,βk
(
γβk + op(1)
)
= 2n
∫
Dck
yr,αdF (x,y, `,m)(1 + op(1))
in the approximating system, whereas for the original system it is
n
∫
Dck
yr,αdF (x,y, `,m)(1 + op(1)).
Hence for each small bank i ∈ [n] the number of incoming r-edges from large banks in the
original system is stochastically dominated by the corresponding number in the approximating
system (for more details see [19]). In particular, the total exposure of i to the set of large banks
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(the weighted sum of incoming edges) is stochastically dominated. This shows the following:
Lemma 6.5. Consider a regular vertex sequence and let sequences {FAk } and {FBk } be con-
structed as above. Further let
(DAk )n and (DBk )n be the sets of finally defaulted banks in the
finitary approximating systems. Then with  denoting stochastic domination it holds that
n−1
∣∣(DAk )n∣∣  n−1|Dn|  n−1 ∣∣(DBk )n∣∣ .
We have hence bounded the final default fraction n−1|Dn| from below and from above using
finitary approximations. We now want to compute the precise final default fractions for these
approximating systems using Theorem 6.3. Let(
fA,Bk
)r,α,β
(z) =
∫
D∞
hr,α,β1 (z,x,y, `,m)dF
A,B
k (x,y, `,m)− zr,α,β,
gA,Bk (z) =
∫
D∞
h2(z,x,y, `,m)dF
A,B
k (x,y, `,m)
the corresponding analogues of f r,α,β and g. Further, denote by zˆAk and (z
∗)Ak resp. zˆ
B
k and
(z∗)Bk the smallest and largest joint roots of all functions
(
fAk
)r,α,β
resp.
(
fBk
)r,α,β
, (r, α, β) ∈ V .
Then we derive the following result comparing these quantities to the original system:
Lemma 6.6. It holds lim infk→∞ gAk
(
zˆAk
) ≥ g(zˆ) and lim supk→∞ gBk ((z∗)Bk ) ≤ g(z∗).
Proof. First note that uniformly for all z ∈ Z and h ∈ H it holds∣∣∣∣∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFA,Bk (x,y, `,m)−
∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF
A,B
k (x,y, `,m)−
∫
Dk
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m)
∣∣∣∣
≤ k−1 → 0, as k →∞.
Since further
∫
Dck
dF → 0 and ∫Dck yr,β1{m = α}dF → 0, as k → ∞, and each h ∈ H is
bounded by the integrands 1 or yr,β1{m = α}, it holds uniformly for all z ∈ Z and h ∈ H that∫
Dck
hdF → 0. Together with ∫Dck hdFAk = 0, this implies∫
D∞
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFAk (x,y, `,m)−
∫
D∞
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m) = o(1) (6.8)
uniformly for all z ∈ Z and h ∈ H.
For {FBk }k∈N, we further need to consider the term
∫
Dck
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFBk (x,y, `,m). Thus∫
Dck
dFBk (x,y, `,m) =
∑
α∈[T ]
γαk ,
∫
Dck
yr,β1{m = α}dFBk (x,y, `,m) = wr,α,βk γαk .
All these quantities tend to 0 as k →∞ (note that wr,α,βk γαk = 2
∫
Dck
yr,β1{m = α}dF if γαk > 0).
Since each function h ∈ H is bounded by one of the (finitely many) integrands from above, this
implies that
∫
Dck
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFBk (x,y, `,m) → 0, as k → ∞, uniformly for all z ∈ Z and
h ∈ H. Therefore we can conclude that also uniformly for all z ∈ Z and h ∈ H,∫
D∞
h(z,x,y, `,m)dFBk (x,y, `,m)−
∫
D∞
h(z,x,y, `,m)dF (x,y, `,m) = o(1). (6.9)
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We now turn to the proof of the first statement: Let  > 0 and define
D :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V
{z ∈ RV+,0 : f r,α,β(z) ∈ [0, ]}.
Further let z ∈ RV+,0 be defined by zr,α,β := infz∈D zr,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V . Then in particular,
z ≤ zˆ componentwise since zˆ ∈ D. Further, z is clearly increasing componentwise as  →
0. Hence the limit z˜ := lim→0 z ≤ zˆ exists. Now note that for fixed (r, α, β) ∈ V , by
definition of z, we find a sequence (zn)n∈N ⊂ D such that limn→∞ zr,α,βn = zr,α,β and zn ≥ z
componentwise. By monotonicity and uniform continuity of f r,α,β on D, we then get
f r,α,β(z) ≤ f r,α,β(z1,1,1n , . . . , zr,α,β , . . . , zR,T,Tn ) = f r,α,β(zn) + o(n) ≤ + o(n)
and hence f r,α,β(z) ≤ . Again by continuity of f r,α,β, we obtain f r,α,β(z˜) = lim→0 f r,α,β(z) ≤
lim→0  = 0. Replacing zˆ by z˜ in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we now get the existence of a joint
root z¯ ≤ z˜ of all the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V . Since zˆ is the smallest joint root by
definition, it thus follows that z˜ = zˆ. Now note that by (6.8) for k large enough we derive
that (fAk )
r,α,β(z) ≥ f r,α,β(z) −  for all z ∈ Z. Further, by construction of FAk , it holds that
(fAk )
r,α,β(z) ≤ f r,α,β(z). In particular, we can conclude that zˆAk ∈ D for k large enough and
hence zˆAk ≥ z. Thus, for each  > 0 by (6.8) we derive lim infk→∞ gAk (zˆAk ) ≥ limk→∞ gAk (z) =
g(z). Finally, using continuity of g and lim→0 z = zˆ, we get the first statement:
lim inf
k→∞
gAk (zˆ
A
k ) ≥ g(zˆ)
If now as in the proof of Theorem 6.3 z∗() is the largest joint root of the additionally shocked
system, we derive by (6.9) that for k large enough it holds
(
fBk
)r,α,β
(z∗()) ≤ f r,α,β(z∗())/2 < 0
for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and hence (z∗)Bk ≤ z∗() componentwise. (Assume E[W+,r,α1{A = β}] > 0
for all (r, α, β) ∈ V such that f r,α,β(z∗()) < 0. Otherwise, we can simply leave out the
coordinates zr,α,β in all the proof since the (r, α, β)-coordinate of all joint roots will be 0.)
Again by (6.9), we then derive lim supk→∞ gBk
(
(z∗)Bk
) ≤ limk→∞ gBk (z∗()) = g(z∗()) and by
letting → 0,
lim sup
k→∞
gBk
(
(z∗)Bk
) ≤ g(z∗).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let  > 0. By Lemma 6.5, we obtain
P
(
n−1|Dn| − g(zˆ) < −
) ≤ P (n−1 ∣∣(DAk )n∣∣− g(zˆ) < −) .
Further, by Lemma 6.6, for k large enough, we have gAk (zˆ
A
k ) > g(zˆ)− /2 and hence
P
(
n−1|Dn| − g(zˆ) < −
) ≤ P (n−1 ∣∣(DAk )n∣∣− gAk (zˆAk ) < −/2) .
Applying Theorem 6.3 to the finitary system, as n→∞ we derive P (n−1|Dn| − g(zˆ) < −)→ 0,
which shows the first part of the theorem.
Similarly, for the second part, by Lemma 6.5
P
(
n−1|Dn| − g(z∗) > 
) ≤ P (n−1 ∣∣(DBk )n∣∣− g(z∗) > )
and by Lemma 6.6, for k large enough it holds that gBk ((z
∗)Bk ) < g(z
∗) + /2. Hence an
application of Theorem 6.3 yields that
P
(
n−1|Dn| − g(z∗) > 
) ≤ P(n−1 ∣∣(DBk )n∣∣− gBk ((z∗)Bk ) > 2)→ 0, as n→∞.
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6.4 Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) and define (fγ)r,α,β(z) := (1− γ)f r,α,β(z) + γ (ζr,α,β − z).
Further, let Sγ :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V {z ∈ RV+,0 : (fγ)r,α,β(z) ≥ 0} and denote by Sγ0 the largest
connected component of Sγ containing 0. Finally, define z∗(γ) by (z∗)r,α,β(γ) := supz∈Sγ0 z
r,α,β.
By the proof of Lemma 6.4 we know that z∗(γ) → 0, as γ → 0, and hence also g(z∗(γ)) → 0,
using continuity of g. Choose now γ > 0 small enough such that g(z∗(γ)) ≤ /3 and δ > 0
small enough such that (fM )r,α,β(z) < (fγ)r,α,β(z) uniformly for all 0 ≤ z ≤ ζ componentwise
and P(M = 0) < δ. Then in particular (z∗)M ≤ z∗(γ) and g((z∗)M ) ≤ g(z∗(γ)) ≤ /3.
If we now possibly decrease δ such that δ ≤ /3, then by Theorem 3.4, we derive for the
final fraction of defaulted banks in the shocked system n−1|DMn | that w. h. p.
n−1|DMn | ≤ gM ((z∗)M ) + /3 ≤ g((z∗)M ) + 2/3 ≤ .
Proof of Lemma 4.6. Let S0(, I) denote the largest connected subset of
S(, I) :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V
{
z ∈ RV+,0 : f r,α,β(z) ≥ −1{(r, α, β) ∈ I}
}
containing 0. Then by replacing S0 in the proof of Lemma 3.2 with S0(, I), we obtain existence
of a smallest (componentwise) point zˆ(, I) ∈ RV+,0 such that f r,α,β(zˆ(, I)) = − for (r, α, β) ∈ I
and f rα,β(zˆ(, I)) = 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ V \I. In particular, zˆ(, I) ∈ S0(, I). Let now
T (, I) :=
⋂
(r,α,β)∈V
{
z ∈ RV+,0 : f r,α,β(z) ≤ −1{(r, α, β) ∈ I}
}
.
Then clearly zˆ(, I) ∈ T (, I). Further, in the proof of the existence of zˆ(, I) we can use any
upper bound z ∈ T (, I), which shows that zˆ(, I) ≤ z componentwise. In particular, zˆ(, I) is
monotone in  and therefore z˜(I) := lim→0+ zˆ(, I) exists.
Let now z¯ ∈ T (I) arbitrary. Then there exists a sequence (zk)k∈N ⊂ RV+,0 with f r,α,β(zk) < 0
for (r, α, β) ∈ I respectively f r,α,β(zk) ≤ 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ V \I such that limk→∞ zk = z¯. By
finiteness of I, we can then find k > 0 such that f
r,α,β(zk) ≤ −k1{(r, α, β) ∈ I} for any
(r, α, β) ∈ V and k ∈ N. In particular, zk ∈ T (k, I) and hence zk ≥ zˆ(k, I) ≥ z˜. As k → ∞,
we can thus conclude that z˜ ≤ z¯ for any z¯ ∈ T (I) and hence z˜ ≤ z0(I). On the other hand,
z˜(I) ∈ T (I) by definition and therefore z˜(I) = z0(I).
Finally, note that z0(I) = lim→0+ zˆ(, I) ∈
⋂
>0 S0(, I) = S0, where the last equality
follows from
⋂
>0 S0(, I) ⊂ S and that
⋂
>0 S0(, I) must be a connected set containing 0
since S0(, I) is a chain of connected, compact sets containing 0.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Let zˆM denote the analogue of zˆ for the ex post shocked system. Then
f r,α,β(zˆM ) + E
[
W+,r,αP
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γ(zˆM )s,β,γ
)
≤ C − 1
)
1{A = β}1{M = 0}
]
= (fM )r,α,β(zˆM ) = 0
and hence f r,α,β(zˆM ) ≤ 0 with equality if and only if E[W+,r,α1{A = β}1{M = 0}] = 0. Define
now  := −max(r,α,β)∈I f r,α,β(zˆM ) > 0, so that zˆM ∈ T (, I), where T (, I) as in the proof of
Lemma 4.6. In the construction of zˆ(, I) (see Lemma 4.6), we can then use the upper bound
34
zˆM and obtain that zˆ(, I) ≤ zˆM and hence zˆM ≥ z0(I). Since now
δ := gM (zˆM )− g(z0(I)) ≥ gM (z0(I))− g(z0(I))
=
∑
β∈[T ]
E
[
P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ0 (I)
)
≤ C − 1
)
1{A = β}1{M = 0}
]
> 0,
we can apply Theorem 3.4 to conclude that
lim
n→∞P
(
n−1|DMn | < g(z0(I))
)
= lim
n→∞P
(
n−1|DMn | < gM (zˆM )− δ
)
= 0
and hence n−1|DMn | ≥ g(z0(I)) w. h. p.
Now assume that z0(I) 6= 0. Since z0(I) is a joint root of the functions f r,α,β, (r, α, β) ∈ V ,
we then derive that there exists (r, α, β) ∈ V such that
E
[
W+,r,αP
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ0 (I)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
= zr,α,β0 (I) > 0
and hence
E
[
P
( ∑
s∈[R]
sPoi
( ∑
γ∈[T ]
W−,s,γzs,β,γ0 (I)
)
≥ C
)
1{A = β}
]
> 0.
In particular, g(z0(I)) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. By Lemma 4.6 clearly z0(V˜ ) ≤ z∗. Assume now that z0(V˜ )  z∗. Then
for some (r, α, β) ∈ V˜ it must hold zr,α,β0 (V˜ ) < (z∗)r,α,β and by the construction of z0(V˜ ) in the
proof of Lemma 4.6 we can find  > 0 such that zr,α,β0 (V˜ ) ≤ zˆr,α,β(, V˜ ) < (z∗)r,α,β. Now by the
definition of z∗ and connectedness of S0, we find S0 3 z˜ ≤ zˆ(, V˜ ) such that z˜r,α,β = zˆr,α,β(, V˜ ).
But then f r,α,β(z˜) ≤ f r,α,β(zˆ(, V˜ )) = − < 0 which contradicts z˜ ∈ S0.
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